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Table of Contents
Preface; 1 Self-Representation; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Egocentric spatial representation as self-representation I: a relationist view; 1.2.1 Egocentric representation: A relationist view; 1.2.1.1 Egocentric representation: initial considerations; 1.2.1.2 Relational content; 1.2.2 A challenge: monadic spatial contents; 1.2.2.1 Simplicity; 1.2.2.2 Ecological and developmental plausibility; 1.2.2.3 Phenomenology; 1.2.2.4 Constitution vs. content; 1.2.3 'Self-representation' introduced; 1.2.4 Summary of Ch. 1.2 and outlook on Ch. 1.3.
1.3 Egocentric spatial representation as self-representation II: Argument from design1.3.1 The argument from design; 1.3.1.1 1st Step: Peculiar design; 1.3.1.2 2nd Step: "Concern"; 1.3.1.3 3rd Step: Peculiar functional role; 1.3.2 Critique of the argument from design; 1.3.3 Interim conclusion and outlook; 2 Action; 2.1 Action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation: Introduction; 2.1.1 Action as a constitutive condition on spatial perception: Brief historical overview; 2.1.2 The notion of 'constitutive condition'; 2.1.2.1 The various notions of 'constitution'
2.1.2.2 McDowell: Constitutive conditions and enabling conditions2.1.2.3 Burge: Constitution and essence; 2.1.3 Summing up; 2.2 Systematic overview of constitutive accounts I: Hurley, Noë, Embodiment approaches; 2.2.1 Introduction; 2.2.2 Susan Hurley's Two-level interdependence view; 2.2.2.1 Instrumental dependence and constitutive dependence; 2.2.2.2 Applying the notion of instrumental dependence to theaccounts of Husserl and Gibson; 2.2.3 Alva Noë's enactive approach; 2.2.4 Embodiment approaches: Shaun Gallagher and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; 2.2.4.1 Embodied action I
Shaun Gallagher.
2.2.4.2 Embodied action II
Maurice Merleau-Ponty2.2.4.3 Summing up embodiment approaches; 2.3 Systematic overview of constitutive accounts II: Kinaesthesis, potentiality and disposition to act; 2.3.1 Late Edmund Husserl; 2.3.2 Max Scheler; 2.3.3 Gareth Evans; 2.3.4 Summary of capability accounts; 2.3.5 Summary of systematic overview; 3 Empirical Evidence; 3.1 Empirical evidence for action as a constitutive condition on spatial perception; 3.1.1 Overview of empirical evidence in favour of constitutive views; 3.1.2 Effects of action on distance and slant perception
The Proffitt studies.
3.1.2.1 Empirical objections to Proffitt studies3.1.2.2 What kind of dependence?; 3.1.2.3 The significance of the results of Proffitt studies; 3.1.3 Inverted vision; 3.1.3.1 A challenge to the sensorimotor view; 3.1.3.2 Inverted vision studies as evidence for capability approaches; 3.1.3.3 An alternative proposal; 3.1.3.4 Summary; 3.1.4 Sensory substitution devices ; 3.1.4.1 Spatial perception or judgment? ; 3.1.4.2 Which account best accommodates the results?; 3.1.4.3 Summary; 3.2 Empirical Challenge: The dual visual systemshypothesis; 3.2.1 The challenge that 2V poses.
1.3 Egocentric spatial representation as self-representation II: Argument from design1.3.1 The argument from design; 1.3.1.1 1st Step: Peculiar design; 1.3.1.2 2nd Step: "Concern"; 1.3.1.3 3rd Step: Peculiar functional role; 1.3.2 Critique of the argument from design; 1.3.3 Interim conclusion and outlook; 2 Action; 2.1 Action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation: Introduction; 2.1.1 Action as a constitutive condition on spatial perception: Brief historical overview; 2.1.2 The notion of 'constitutive condition'; 2.1.2.1 The various notions of 'constitution'
2.1.2.2 McDowell: Constitutive conditions and enabling conditions2.1.2.3 Burge: Constitution and essence; 2.1.3 Summing up; 2.2 Systematic overview of constitutive accounts I: Hurley, Noë, Embodiment approaches; 2.2.1 Introduction; 2.2.2 Susan Hurley's Two-level interdependence view; 2.2.2.1 Instrumental dependence and constitutive dependence; 2.2.2.2 Applying the notion of instrumental dependence to theaccounts of Husserl and Gibson; 2.2.3 Alva Noë's enactive approach; 2.2.4 Embodiment approaches: Shaun Gallagher and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; 2.2.4.1 Embodied action I
Shaun Gallagher.
2.2.4.2 Embodied action II
Maurice Merleau-Ponty2.2.4.3 Summing up embodiment approaches; 2.3 Systematic overview of constitutive accounts II: Kinaesthesis, potentiality and disposition to act; 2.3.1 Late Edmund Husserl; 2.3.2 Max Scheler; 2.3.3 Gareth Evans; 2.3.4 Summary of capability accounts; 2.3.5 Summary of systematic overview; 3 Empirical Evidence; 3.1 Empirical evidence for action as a constitutive condition on spatial perception; 3.1.1 Overview of empirical evidence in favour of constitutive views; 3.1.2 Effects of action on distance and slant perception
The Proffitt studies.
3.1.2.1 Empirical objections to Proffitt studies3.1.2.2 What kind of dependence?; 3.1.2.3 The significance of the results of Proffitt studies; 3.1.3 Inverted vision; 3.1.3.1 A challenge to the sensorimotor view; 3.1.3.2 Inverted vision studies as evidence for capability approaches; 3.1.3.3 An alternative proposal; 3.1.3.4 Summary; 3.1.4 Sensory substitution devices ; 3.1.4.1 Spatial perception or judgment? ; 3.1.4.2 Which account best accommodates the results?; 3.1.4.3 Summary; 3.2 Empirical Challenge: The dual visual systemshypothesis; 3.2.1 The challenge that 2V poses.