@article{1358441,
      recid = {1358441},
      author = {Nie, Huihua. and Li, Haifeng. and Chen, Ping.},
      title = {Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China : a  Reflection on the China Model.},
      publisher = {Springer Singapore,},
      address = {Singapore :},
      pages = {1 online resource (257 pages)},
      year = {2017},
      note = {6.1.2.1 Theory: Collusion distorts incentives for  development and research.},
      abstract = {By analyzing the interactions between China's central  government and its local governments and enterprises, this  book constructs an analytical framework of  government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of  collusion within the China model on Chinese society.  Against the background of decentralization and under  information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local  governments connive at enterprises' adoption of a low-cost  'bad' mode of production -- a 'stimulus' for quick growth  at the cost of safer working conditions -- so as to obtain  fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through  an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental  pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues  that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model.  It consider how against a backdrop of political  centralization and economic decentralization, collusion  exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country's  social development and on its foreign direct investment.  Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China  model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve  domestic institutional construction through reform.},
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/1358441},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6},
}