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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Maps; Part I An Anatomy of the China Model from the Perspective of Collusion; Chapter 1 Introduction; 1.1 The China Model; 1.2 Cost of Economic Growth; 1.3 Main Arguments; 1.4 Key Concepts; 1.5 The Structure of This Book; References; Chapter 2 Government-Firm Collusion: A New Analytical Framework; 2.1 Three PX Projects; 2.1.1 Dalian XP Project: Relocation and Expansion; 2.1.2 Xiamen's PX Project: Relocation; 2.1.3 Ningbo's PX Project: Abortion; 2.2 The China Model Driven by Government-Firm Collusion.
2.3 Government-Firm Collusion Model2.3.1 Game Players; 2.3.2 Information Structure; 2.3.3 Utility Function; 2.3.4 Time Line; 2.4 The Optimal Equilibrium Collusion and Collusion-Proof Contract; 2.4.1 Equilibrium Collusion; 2.4.2 Collusion-Proof Contract; 2.4.3 Allowing Collusion Versus Deterring Collusion; 2.4.4 The Role of Compensation; 2.5 A Case Study; 2.6 Extended Discussions; 2.6.1 The Local Government's Lack of Long-Term Expectation; 2.6.2 Imposition of Exorbitant Taxation on the Firm; 2.6.3 Ineffectiveness of Supervision of the Mass Media.
2.6.4 Lack of Credibility of Punishment2.7 Summary; References; Chapter 3 Collusion and Coalmine Accidents; 3.1 High Frequency of Coalmine Accidents; 3.2 The Evolution of China's Coalmine Safety Supervision System; 3.3 Testing Approaches to Government-Firm Collusion; 3.4 Results of Econometric Analysis; 3.4.1 Sources of Data; 3.4.2 Data Description; 3.4.3 Main Results; 3.5 Robustness Test; 3.5.1 More Control Variables; 3.5.2 A More Rigorous Test; 3.6 Summary; References; Chapter 4 Collusion and House Prices; 4.1 An Overview of Exorbitant House Prices in China.
4.2 Three Different Views About Exorbitant HousePrices4.3 The Institutional Background of Housing Market Control; 4.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization Between the Central Government and Local Governments; 4.3.2 Housing and Land Reform; 4.4 High House Prices Driven up by Collusion; 4.5 Results of Econometric Tests; 4.5.1 Model Specification; 4.5.2 Data Description; 4.5.3 An Analysis of Regression Results of Housing Variables; 4.5.4 Robustness Test; 4.6 Summary; References; Chapter 5 Pollution, Illegal Land Use, and Other Major Social Problems; 5.1 Environment Pollution.
5.1.1 An Overview of Pollution in China5.1.2 Collusion and Pollution; 5.2 Illegal Use of Land; 5.3 Local Negative Externalities; 5.4 Smuggling; 5.5 Food Safety; 5.6 Other Major Problems; 5.7 Summary; References; Part II The Impact of Collusion and Institutional Environment; Chapter 6 The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment; 6.1 Collusion Hindering Technological Innovation; 6.1.1 The Facts of Technological Innovation in Chinese Enterprises; 6.1.2 Collusion Hindering Innovative Motivation.
2.3 Government-Firm Collusion Model2.3.1 Game Players; 2.3.2 Information Structure; 2.3.3 Utility Function; 2.3.4 Time Line; 2.4 The Optimal Equilibrium Collusion and Collusion-Proof Contract; 2.4.1 Equilibrium Collusion; 2.4.2 Collusion-Proof Contract; 2.4.3 Allowing Collusion Versus Deterring Collusion; 2.4.4 The Role of Compensation; 2.5 A Case Study; 2.6 Extended Discussions; 2.6.1 The Local Government's Lack of Long-Term Expectation; 2.6.2 Imposition of Exorbitant Taxation on the Firm; 2.6.3 Ineffectiveness of Supervision of the Mass Media.
2.6.4 Lack of Credibility of Punishment2.7 Summary; References; Chapter 3 Collusion and Coalmine Accidents; 3.1 High Frequency of Coalmine Accidents; 3.2 The Evolution of China's Coalmine Safety Supervision System; 3.3 Testing Approaches to Government-Firm Collusion; 3.4 Results of Econometric Analysis; 3.4.1 Sources of Data; 3.4.2 Data Description; 3.4.3 Main Results; 3.5 Robustness Test; 3.5.1 More Control Variables; 3.5.2 A More Rigorous Test; 3.6 Summary; References; Chapter 4 Collusion and House Prices; 4.1 An Overview of Exorbitant House Prices in China.
4.2 Three Different Views About Exorbitant HousePrices4.3 The Institutional Background of Housing Market Control; 4.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization Between the Central Government and Local Governments; 4.3.2 Housing and Land Reform; 4.4 High House Prices Driven up by Collusion; 4.5 Results of Econometric Tests; 4.5.1 Model Specification; 4.5.2 Data Description; 4.5.3 An Analysis of Regression Results of Housing Variables; 4.5.4 Robustness Test; 4.6 Summary; References; Chapter 5 Pollution, Illegal Land Use, and Other Major Social Problems; 5.1 Environment Pollution.
5.1.1 An Overview of Pollution in China5.1.2 Collusion and Pollution; 5.2 Illegal Use of Land; 5.3 Local Negative Externalities; 5.4 Smuggling; 5.5 Food Safety; 5.6 Other Major Problems; 5.7 Summary; References; Part II The Impact of Collusion and Institutional Environment; Chapter 6 The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment; 6.1 Collusion Hindering Technological Innovation; 6.1.1 The Facts of Technological Innovation in Chinese Enterprises; 6.1.2 Collusion Hindering Innovative Motivation.