Feeling pain and being in pain / Nikola Grahek.
2007
RB127 .G727 2007eb
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Details
Title
Feeling pain and being in pain / Nikola Grahek.
Author
Grahek, Nikola.
Edition
2nd ed.
ISBN
9780262274234 (electronic bk.)
026227423X (electronic bk.)
9781429465571
1429465573
9780262072830 (hbk.)
0262072831 (hbk.)
026227423X (electronic bk.)
9781429465571
1429465573
9780262072830 (hbk.)
0262072831 (hbk.)
Publication Details
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2007.
Copyright
©2007
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (181 pages)
Call Number
RB127 .G727 2007eb
Dewey Decimal Classification
616/.0472
Summary
An examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience--pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain--and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory, cognitive, and behavioral components.In Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes--the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, and its opposite, the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)--have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience.Grahek explains the crucial distinction betweenfeeling pain and being in pain, defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components, the role they play in overall pain experience, the way they work together, and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them.Feeling Pain and Being in Pain does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead, Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind-brain phenomena.
Note
"A Bradford book."
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