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001385744 020__ $$a0262270188
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001385744 035__ $$a(OCoLC)1058612268$$z(OCoLC)253933015$$z(OCoLC)1096662027
001385744 035__ $$a(OCoLC-P)1058612268
001385744 040__ $$aOCoLC-P$$beng$$cOCoLC-P
001385744 050_4 $$aHG8051.C574 2006
001385744 08204 $$a368/.01
001385744 24500 $$aCompetitive failures in insurance markets :$$btheory and policy implications.
001385744 26431 $$a[Place of publication not identified]$$bMIT Press$$c2006
001385744 300__ $$a1 online resource.
001385744 336__ $$atext$$btxt
001385744 337__ $$acomputer$$bc
001385744 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr
001385744 4901_ $$aCESifo seminar series
001385744 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001385744 520__ $$aLeading international economists offer new insights on recent developments in the economic analysis of the limits of insurability, with particular attention of adverse selection and moral hazard.Risk sharing is a cornerstone of modern economies. It is valuable to risk-averse consumers and essential for investment and entrepreneurs. The standard economic model of risk exchange predicts that competition in insurance markets will result in all individual risks being insured--that all diversifiable risks in the economy will be covered through mutual risk-sharing arrangements--but in practice this is not the case. Many diversifiable risks are still borne by individuals; many environmental, catastrophic, and technological risks are not covered by insurance contracts. In this CESifo volume, leading international economists provide new insights on recent developments in the economic analysis of the limits of insurability. They find that asymmetric information is a central reason why competition in insurance markets may fail to guarantee that mutually advantageous risk exchanges are realized in today's economies. In particular, adverse selection and moral hazard help explain why competitive insurance markets fail to provide an efficient level of insurance and hence why public intervention is required to solve the problem. The contributors offer theoretical models of insurance markets involving adverse selection as well as empirical analyses of health insurance and non-health insurance markets in countries including Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.ContributorsLuis H. B. Braido, Mark J. Browne, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Georges Dionne, Irena Dushi, Roland Eisen, Lucien Gardiol, Pierre-Yves Geoffard, Christian Gourieroux, Chantal Grandchamp, Erik Gronqvist, Luigi Guiso, Paul Kofman, Hansjorg Lehmann, Gregory P. Nini
001385744 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001385744 650_0 $$aInsurance$$xMathematical models.
001385744 650_0 $$aHealth insurance$$xMathematical models.
001385744 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Industrial Organization
001385744 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Political Economy
001385744 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001385744 7001_ $$aGollier, Christian,$$eContributor.
001385744 7001_ $$aChiappori, Pierre-Andrâe.,$$eContributor.
001385744 7001_ $$aChiappori, Pierre-André,$$eContributor.
001385744 852__ $$bebk
001385744 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1986.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001385744 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001385744 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385744$$pGLOBAL_SET
001385744 980__ $$aBIB
001385744 980__ $$aEBOOK
001385744 982__ $$aEbook
001385744 983__ $$aOnline