001385833 000__ 03314cam\a2200481Ma\4500 001385833 001__ 1385833 001385833 003__ MaCbMITP 001385833 005__ 20240325105012.0 001385833 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\ 001385833 007__ cr\un\nnnunnun 001385833 008__ 170301s2017\\\\mau\\\\\o\\\\\000\0\eng\d 001385833 020__ $$a9780262340380 001385833 020__ $$a0262340380 001385833 020__ $$z9780262036269 (hardcover : alk. paper) 001385833 035__ $$a(OCoLC)1053193568$$z(OCoLC)1054062470$$z(OCoLC)1079022736$$z(OCoLC)1088953583$$z(OCoLC)1088968128 001385833 035__ $$a(OCoLC-P)1053193568 001385833 040__ $$aOCoLC-P$$beng$$cOCoLC-P 001385833 05000 $$aHJ5316$$b.G56 2017 001385833 08204 $$a363.738/746$$223 001385833 24500 $$aGlobal Carbon Pricing$$h[electronic resource] :$$bThe Path to Climate Cooperation /$$cedited by Peter Cramton, David JC MacKay, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft. 001385833 260__ $$aCambridge, MA :$$bMIT Press,$$c[2017]$$e(Baltimore, Md. :$$fProject MUSE,$$g2015) 001385833 300__ $$a1 online resource (xv, 252 pages :)$$billustrations 001385833 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent 001385833 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia 001385833 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier 001385833 520__ $$aWhy the traditional "pledge and review" climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed.After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a "pledge and review" approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a "common commitment" scheme is more effective than an "individual commitment" scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity ("we will if you will").The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference.ContributorsRichard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Eloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman 001385833 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record. 001385833 650_0 $$aGreenhouse gas mitigation. 001385833 650_0 $$aEnvironmental impact charges. 001385833 650_0 $$aCarbon taxes. 001385833 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Environmental Economics 001385833 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Political Economy 001385833 655_0 $$aElectronic books 001385833 7001_ $$aOckenfels, Axel,$$eeditor. 001385833 7001_ $$aMacKay, David J. C.,$$eeditor. 001385833 7001_ $$aCramton, Peter C.,$$eeditor. 001385833 7102_ $$aProject Muse. 001385833 852__ $$bebk 001385833 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10914.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct 001385833 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf 001385833 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385833$$pGLOBAL_SET 001385833 980__ $$aBIB 001385833 980__ $$aEBOOK 001385833 982__ $$aEbook 001385833 983__ $$aOnline