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001385885 035__ $$a(OCoLC)52596807
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001385885 08204 $$a630/.68$$221
001385885 1001_ $$aAllen, Douglas W.$$q(Douglas Ward),$$d1960-
001385885 24514 $$aThe nature of the farm :$$bcontracts, risk, and organization in agriculture /$$cDouglas W. Allen and Dean Lueck.
001385885 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2002.
001385885 300__ $$a1 online resource (viii, 258 pages)
001385885 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001385885 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001385885 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001385885 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001385885 520__ $$aThe Nature of the Farm is a theoretical and empirical study of contracts and organization in agriculture based on the transaction cost framework. Transaction costs are important in agriculture because nature (for example, seasonality, weather, pests) plays such a critical role in determining output and limiting the ability of farmers to specialize. The book develops specific models and tests the implications of those models against data sets from across North American agriculture, as well as against historical case studies such as eighteenth-century European land contracts and the late nineteenth-century Bonanza farms in the United States.The book is organized in three parts. Part I examines the classic question of what determines the optimal choice between fixed rent and cropshare arrangements, concluding that it is determined by a trade-off between incentives to overuse rented land and incentives to underreport shared output. Part II tests several predictions derived from a standard risk-sharing model of contracts and finds little evidence that risk sharing is important in contract choice. Part III extends the transaction costs analysis to broader organizational issues. It introduces seasonality and timeliness costs as forces influencing the gains from specialization and the costs of contracting, and finds that farm ownership and farm organization are routinely shaped by these forces.
001385885 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001385885 650_0 $$aFarm management.
001385885 650_0 $$aAgriculture$$xEconomic aspects.
001385885 650_0 $$aSharecropping.
001385885 650_0 $$aRisk management.
001385885 650_0 $$aAgricultural contracts.
001385885 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Environmental Economics
001385885 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Industrial Organization
001385885 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001385885 7001_ $$aLueck, Dean.
001385885 852__ $$bebk
001385885 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4883.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001385885 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001385885 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385885$$pGLOBAL_SET
001385885 980__ $$aBIB
001385885 980__ $$aEBOOK
001385885 982__ $$aEbook
001385885 983__ $$aOnline