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001385915 035__ $$a(OCoLC)53883138$$z(OCoLC)961660659$$z(OCoLC)962703654$$z(OCoLC)992070152$$z(OCoLC)1053339754$$z(OCoLC)1058019474
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001385915 072_7 $$aMAT$$x011000$$2bisacsh
001385915 08204 $$a519.3$$222
001385915 1001_ $$aCressman, Ross.
001385915 24510 $$aEvolutionary dynamics and extensive form games /$$cRoss Cressman.
001385915 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c2003.
001385915 300__ $$a1 online resource (xii, 316 pages) :$$billustrations.
001385915 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001385915 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001385915 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001385915 4901_ $$aEconomic learning and social evolution ;$$v5
001385915 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001385915 520__ $$aAn analysis of standard evolutionary dynamics adapted to extensive form games.Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.The book offers a synthesis of current knowledge about extensive form games from an evolutionary perspective, emphasizing connections between the extensive form representation and dynamic models that traditionally have been applied to biological and economic phenomena. It develops a general theory to analyze dynamically arbitrary extensive form games and applies this theory to a range of examples. It lays the foundation for the analysis of specific extensive form models of behavior and for the further theoretical study of extensive form evolutionary games.
001385915 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001385915 650_0 $$aGame theory.
001385915 650_0 $$aEvolution$$xMathematical models.
001385915 653__ $$aECONOMICS/General
001385915 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001385915 852__ $$bebk
001385915 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2884.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001385915 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001385915 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385915$$pGLOBAL_SET
001385915 980__ $$aBIB
001385915 980__ $$aEBOOK
001385915 982__ $$aEbook
001385915 983__ $$aOnline