Associative engines : connectionism, concepts, and representational change / Andy Clark.
1993
Q335 .C525 1993eb
Linked e-resources
Linked Resource
Online Access through The MIT Press Direct
Details
Title
Associative engines : connectionism, concepts, and representational change / Andy Clark.
Author
Clark, Andy, 1957-
ISBN
9780262270427 (electronic bk.)
0262270420 (electronic bk.)
0585023387 (electronic bk.)
9780585023380 (electronic bk.)
9780262032100
0262032104
0262032104
0262270420 (electronic bk.)
0585023387 (electronic bk.)
9780585023380 (electronic bk.)
9780262032100
0262032104
0262032104
Publication Details
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1993.
Copyright
©1993
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xiii, 252 pages) : illustrations
Call Number
Q335 .C525 1993eb
Dewey Decimal Classification
006.3
Summary
Connectionist approaches, Andy Clark argues, are driving cognitive science toward a radical reconception of its explanatory endeavor. At the heart of this reconception lies a shift toward a new and more deeply developmental vision of the mind - a vision that has important implications for the philosophical and psychological understanding of the nature of concepts, of mental causation, and of representational change.Combining philosophical argument, empirical results, and interdisciplinary speculations, Clark charts a fundamental shift from a static, inner-code-oriented conception of the subject matter of cognitive science to a more dynamic, developmentally rich, process-oriented view. Clark argues that this shift makes itself felt in two main ways. First, structured representations are seen as the products of temporally extended cognitive activity and not as the representational bedrock (an innate symbol system or language of thought) upon which all learning is based. Second, the relation between thoughts (as described by folk psychology) and inner computational states is loosened as a result of the fragmented and distributed nature of the connectionist representation of concepts. Other issues Clark raises include the nature of innate knowledge, the conceptual commitments of folk psychology, and the use and abuse of higher-level analyses of connectionist networks. Andy Clark is Reader in Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex, in England. He's the author of Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing.
Note
"A Bradford book."
Connectionist approaches, Andy Clark argues, are driving cognitive science toward a radical reconception of its explanatory endeavor. At the heart of this reconception lies a shift toward a new and more deeply developmental vision of the mind - a vision that has important implications for the philosophical and psychological understanding of the nature of concepts, of mental causation, and of representational change.Combining philosophical argument, empirical results, and interdisciplinary speculations, Clark charts a fundamental shift from a static, inner-code-oriented conception of the subject matter of cognitive science to a more dynamic, developmentally rich, process-oriented view. Clark argues that this shift makes itself felt in two main ways. First, structured representations are seen as the products of temporally extended cognitive activity and not as the representational bedrock (an innate symbol system or language of thought) upon which all learning is based. Second, the relation between thoughts (as described by folk psychology) and inner computational states is loosened as a result of the fragmented and distributed nature of the connectionist representation of concepts. Other issues Clark raises include the nature of innate knowledge, the conceptual commitments of folk psychology, and the use and abuse of higher-level analyses of connectionist networks. Andy Clark is Reader in Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex, in England. He's the author of Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing.
Connectionist approaches, Andy Clark argues, are driving cognitive science toward a radical reconception of its explanatory endeavor. At the heart of this reconception lies a shift toward a new and more deeply developmental vision of the mind - a vision that has important implications for the philosophical and psychological understanding of the nature of concepts, of mental causation, and of representational change.Combining philosophical argument, empirical results, and interdisciplinary speculations, Clark charts a fundamental shift from a static, inner-code-oriented conception of the subject matter of cognitive science to a more dynamic, developmentally rich, process-oriented view. Clark argues that this shift makes itself felt in two main ways. First, structured representations are seen as the products of temporally extended cognitive activity and not as the representational bedrock (an innate symbol system or language of thought) upon which all learning is based. Second, the relation between thoughts (as described by folk psychology) and inner computational states is loosened as a result of the fragmented and distributed nature of the connectionist representation of concepts. Other issues Clark raises include the nature of innate knowledge, the conceptual commitments of folk psychology, and the use and abuse of higher-level analyses of connectionist networks. Andy Clark is Reader in Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex, in England. He's the author of Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
Record Appears in
Online Resources > Ebooks
All Resources
All Resources