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001385959 1001_ $$aMortensen, Dale.
001385959 24510 $$aWage dispersion :$$bwhy are similar workers paid differently? /$$cDale T. Mortensen.
001385959 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2003.
001385959 300__ $$a1 online resource (xii, 143 pages) :$$billustrations.
001385959 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001385959 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001385959 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001385959 4901_ $$aZeuthen lecture book series
001385959 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001385959 520__ $$aWhy are workers with identical skills found in both "good" jobs and "bad" jobs? Why are workers who do similar jobs paid differently, contrary to standard competitive theory? Observable differences in workers doing the same job account for only 30 percent of wage variation. In Wage Dispersion, Dale Mortensen examines the reasons for pay differentials in the other 70 percent. He finds that these differentials, or wage dispersion, are largely the result of job search friction (which arises when workers do not know the wages offered by all employers) and cross-firm differences in wage policy and productivity.Mortensen examines previous theoretical explanations for wage dispersion, testing them against data from a Danish matched employer-employee database. He begins by offering a simple one-period model of the problem, then expands this basic model intertemporally to include the role of on-the-job worker search behavior. Following this, he discusses theoretical modifications that offer an explanation for the nature of observed wage dispersion, particularly the shape of cross-firm wage distribution. He then examines the hypothesis that wage policies are determined by profit-maximizing behavior and finds that the Danish data do not support it; he argues that bilateral wage bargaining is the more likely determinant. Finally, he reviews recent work that extends the basic theoretical framework to explain wage dispersion within firms.
001385959 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001385959 650_0 $$aPay equity.
001385959 650_0 $$aEqual pay for equal work.
001385959 650_0 $$aWages and labor productivity.
001385959 650_0 $$aWages$$xMathematical models.
001385959 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Labor Studies
001385959 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001385959 852__ $$bebk
001385959 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7147.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001385959 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001385959 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385959$$pGLOBAL_SET
001385959 980__ $$aBIB
001385959 980__ $$aEBOOK
001385959 982__ $$aEbook
001385959 983__ $$aOnline