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001385965 1001_ $$aPersson, Torsten,$$eauthor.
001385965 24514 $$aThe economic effects of constitutions /$$cTorsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.
001385965 264_1 $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c[2003]
001385965 264_4 $$c©2003
001385965 300__ $$a1 online resource (xiii, 306 pages) :$$b1 map.
001385965 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001385965 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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001385965 4901_ $$aMunich lectures in economics
001385965 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001385965 5201_ $$a"The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less-targeted government spending and larger budget deficits.
001385965 5208_ $$aMoreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth."--Jacket.
001385965 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001385965 650_0 $$aConstitutional law$$xEconomic aspects.
001385965 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Political Economy
001385965 653__ $$aSOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/General
001385965 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001385965 7001_ $$aTabellini, Guido Enrico,$$d1956-$$eauthor.
001385965 852__ $$bebk
001385965 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2591.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001385965 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001385965 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1385965$$pGLOBAL_SET
001385965 980__ $$aBIB
001385965 980__ $$aEBOOK
001385965 982__ $$aEbook
001385965 983__ $$aOnline