The economic effects of constitutions / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.

9780262281423 (electronic bk.)
0262281422 (electronic bk.)
0585481121 (electronic bk.)
9780585481128 (electronic bk.)
0262162199
9780262162197
0262661926
9780262661928

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2003]

©2003

English

1 online resource (xiii, 306 pages) : 1 map.

9780262162197

K3165 .P474 2003eb

338.9

"The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less-targeted government spending and larger budget deficits.
Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth."--Jacket.

Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth."--Jacket.

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