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001386190 1001_ $$aPolger, Thomas W.
001386190 24510 $$aNatural minds /$$cThomas W. Polger.
001386190 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2004.
001386190 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxvii, 294 pages) :$$billustrations
001386190 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386190 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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001386190 500__ $$a"A Bradford book."
001386190 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386190 520__ $$aIn Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties--a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion.Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory--Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism.
001386190 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386190 650_0 $$aMind-brain identity theory.
001386190 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001386190 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386190 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386190 852__ $$bebk
001386190 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4863.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386190 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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001386190 980__ $$aBIB
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