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001386194 1001_ $$aPrinz, Jesse J.
001386194 24510 $$aFurnishing the mind :$$bconcepts and their perceptual basis /$$cJesse J. Prinz.
001386194 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2002.
001386194 264_4 $$c©2002
001386194 300__ $$a1 online resource (x, 358 pages) :$$billustrations
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001386194 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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001386194 500__ $$a"A Bradford book."
001386194 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386194 5208_ $$aWestern philosophy has long been divided between empiricists, who argue that human understanding has its basis in experience, and rationalists, who argue that reason is the source of knowledge. A central issue in the debate is the nature of concepts, the internal representations we use to think about the world. The traditional empiricist thesis that concepts are built up from sensory input has fallen out of favor. Mainstream cognitive science tends to echo the rationalist tradition, with its emphasis on innateness. In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism. Prinz provides a critical survey of leading theories of concepts, including imagism, definitionism, prototype theory, exemplar theory, the theory theory, and informational atomism. He sets forth a new defense of concept empiricism that draws on philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology and introduces a new version of concept empiricism called proxytype theory. He also provides accounts of abstract concepts, intentionality, narrow content, and concept combination. In an extended discussion of innateness, he covers Noam Chomsky's arguments for the innateness of grammar, developmental psychologists' arguments for innate cognitive domains, and Jerry Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism.
001386194 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386194 650_0 $$aPhilosophy of mind.
001386194 650_0 $$aConcepts.
001386194 650_0 $$aPerception.
001386194 650_0 $$aEmpiricism.
001386194 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386194 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001386194 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386194 852__ $$bebk
001386194 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3169.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386194 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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001386194 980__ $$aBIB
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