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001386205 020__ $$a9780262316279
001386205 020__ $$a0262316277
001386205 020__ $$z0262072653$$q(alk. paper)
001386205 020__ $$z9780262072656$$q(alk. paper)
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001386205 035__ $$a(OCoLC)607608354$$z(OCoLC)317410249$$z(OCoLC)608169569$$z(OCoLC)609363072$$z(OCoLC)1014406109$$z(OCoLC)1014450307$$z(OCoLC)1014474506$$z(OCoLC)1014484348$$z(OCoLC)1019803279$$z(OCoLC)1032577211$$z(OCoLC)1044450815$$z(OCoLC)1047745494$$z(OCoLC)1078012221
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001386205 050_4 $$aBD418.3$$b.G46 2006
001386205 08204 $$a128/.2$$222
001386205 1001_ $$aGeorgalis, Nicholas,$$d1944-
001386205 24514 $$aThe primacy of the subjective :$$bfoundations for a unified theory of mind and language /$$cNicholas Georgalis.
001386205 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2006.
001386205 264_4 $$c©2006
001386205 300__ $$a1 online resource (xvi, 352 pages)
001386205 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386205 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386205 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386205 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386205 520__ $$aA proposal that the concept of minimal content--a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept--plays a necessary, pivotal, foundational, and unifying role in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content--a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study of mind and language and argues that these deficiencies can be corrected only by the incorporation of a first-person methodology. Nevertheless, this expanded methodology makes possible an objective understanding of the subjective.Georgalis argues against the conflation of consciousness and subjectivity with phenomenal experience. Consequently, and contrary to common belief, he argues that consciousness without phenomenality is as strongly implicated in intentionality as it is in phenomenal states. He proposes a broader understanding of the "hard problem" of consciousness, arguing that there is an "explanatory gap problem" for both phenomenal and intentional states. His theory provides a framework that renders the vexing relations between mental and brain states comprehensible. Georgalis also argues for novel explanations of the phenomenal and of representation--explanations that follow from the core concept of minimal content. Treating the topics of meaning and reference, he introduces a first-person concept of intended reference derivative from minimal content that resolves various problems in the philosophy of language.Eschewing ontology, Georgalis proposes his theory as a means to make sense of, analyze, and relate issues in the philosophies of mind and language. The concept of minimal content, he argues, plays a necessary, pivotal, unifying, and foundational role in advancing our understanding of these issues.
001386205 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386205 650_0 $$aPhilosophy of mind.
001386205 650_0 $$aSubject (Philosophy)
001386205 650_0 $$aIntentionality (Philosophy)
001386205 650_0 $$aLanguage and languages$$xPhilosophy.
001386205 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386205 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
001386205 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386205 852__ $$bebk
001386205 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5537.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386205 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001386205 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1386205$$pGLOBAL_SET
001386205 980__ $$aBIB
001386205 980__ $$aEBOOK
001386205 982__ $$aEbook
001386205 983__ $$aOnline