@article{1386221,
      recid = {1386221},
      author = {Betti, Arianna,},
      title = {Against facts /},
      pages = {1 online resource (xxvii, 296 pages) :},
      abstract = {"In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good  reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at  least as they are described by the two major metaphysical  theories of facts. She claims that neither of these  theories is tenable--neither the theory according to which  facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor  the theory according to which facts are whatever is named  by certain expressions of the form 'the fact that such and  such.' There is reality, and there are entities in reality  that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these  entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the  philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the  main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two  major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and  propositional, giving special attention to methodological  presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts  as special structured building blocks of reality) and the  central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument.  She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever  is named in "the fact that" statements) and what she calls  the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's  criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that  metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and  philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against  entities on the basis of how we use language"--MIT CogNet.},
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/1386221},
}