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001386221 1001_ $$aBetti, Arianna,$$d1970-$$eauthor.
001386221 24510 $$aAgainst facts /$$cArianna Betti.
001386221 264_1 $$aCambridge, Massachusetts ;$$aLondon, England :$$bMIT Press,$$c[2015]
001386221 264_4 $$c©2015
001386221 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxvii, 296 pages) :$$billustrations
001386221 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386221 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386221 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386221 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386221 520__ $$a"In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenable--neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form 'the fact that such and such.' There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in "the fact that" statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language"--MIT CogNet.
001386221 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386221 650_0 $$aFacts (Philosophy)
001386221 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386221 653__ $$aLINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE/General
001386221 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386221 852__ $$bebk
001386221 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386221 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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001386221 980__ $$aBIB
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001386221 983__ $$aOnline