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001386387 020__ $$z0262182475$$q(alk. paper)
001386387 020__ $$z9780262182478$$q(alk. paper)
001386387 035__ $$a(OCoLC)652441852$$z(OCoLC)301109064$$z(OCoLC)508274312$$z(OCoLC)580856580$$z(OCoLC)990585175$$z(OCoLC)1014402350$$z(OCoLC)1014424183$$z(OCoLC)1014476585$$z(OCoLC)1014488394$$z(OCoLC)1019801837$$z(OCoLC)1032582180$$z(OCoLC)1044379335$$z(OCoLC)1047761495$$z(OCoLC)1056528201$$z(OCoLC)1060909388$$z(OCoLC)1074326981
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001386387 050_4 $$aB105.M55$$bR63 2005
001386387 08204 $$a128/.2$$222
001386387 1001_ $$aRockwell, W. Teed.
001386387 24510 $$aNeither brain nor ghost :$$ba nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory /$$cW. Teed Rockwell.
001386387 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2005.
001386387 264_4 $$c©2005
001386387 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxii, 231 pages) :$$billustrations
001386387 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386387 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386387 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386387 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386387 520__ $$aIn this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory--which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)--and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems.Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST).
001386387 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386387 650_0 $$aMind-brain identity theory.
001386387 650_0 $$aMind and body.
001386387 650_0 $$aPragmatism.
001386387 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386387 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386387 852__ $$bebk
001386387 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4910.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386387 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001386387 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1386387$$pGLOBAL_SET
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001386387 980__ $$aEBOOK
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001386387 983__ $$aOnline