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001386395 020__ $$a9780262272902$$q(electronic bk.)
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001386395 1001_ $$aFodor, Jerry A.
001386395 24514 $$aThe mind doesn't work that way :$$bthe scope and limits of computational psychology /$$cJerry Fodor.
001386395 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©2001.
001386395 300__ $$a1 online resource (126 pages).
001386395 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386395 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386395 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386395 4901_ $$aRepresentation and mind
001386395 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386395 5208_ $$aAnnotation$$bIn this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.
001386395 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386395 650_0 $$aComputational intelligence.
001386395 650_0 $$aCognitive psychology.
001386395 650_0 $$aCognitive science.
001386395 650_0 $$aPhilosophy of mind.
001386395 650_0 $$aNativism (Psychology)
001386395 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001386395 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
001386395 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386395 7102_ $$aM.I.T. Press.
001386395 852__ $$bebk
001386395 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4627.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386395 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001386395 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1386395$$pGLOBAL_SET
001386395 980__ $$aBIB
001386395 980__ $$aEBOOK
001386395 982__ $$aEbook
001386395 983__ $$aOnline