001386397 000__ 02683cam\a2200433M\\4500
001386397 001__ 1386397
001386397 003__ MaCbMITP
001386397 005__ 20240325105130.0
001386397 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\
001386397 007__ cr\un\nnnunnun
001386397 008__ 160810e19971208riu\\\\\o\\\\\000\0\eng\d
001386397 020__ $$a9780262276801
001386397 020__ $$a0262276801$$q(E-Book)
001386397 0243_ $$a9780262276801
001386397 035__ $$a(OCoLC)961888968
001386397 035__ $$a(OCoLC-P)961888968
001386397 040__ $$aOCoLC-P$$beng$$cOCoLC-P
001386397 050_4 $$aB835
001386397 08204 $$a149.2
001386397 1001_ $$aKatz, Jerrold J.,$$eauthor.
001386397 24510 $$aRealistic Rationalism.
001386397 260__ $$aCambridge :$$bMIT Press$$cDec. 1997.
001386397 300__ $$a1 online resource (262 pages).
001386397 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386397 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386397 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386397 4901_ $$aRepresentation and Mind Ser.
001386397 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386397 5208_ $$aAnnotation$$bIn Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold J. Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this position to meet the principal challenges to realism. In exposing the flaws in criticisms of the antirealists, he shows that realists can explain knowledge of abstract objects without supposing we have causal contact with them, that numbers are determinate objects, and that the standard counterexamples to the abstract/concrete distinction have no force. Generalizing the account of knowledge used to meet the challenges to realism, he develops a rationalist and non-naturalist account of philosophical knowledge and argues that it is preferable to contemporary naturalist and empiricist accounts. The book illuminates a wide range of philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity, the distinction between the formal and natural sciences, empiricist holism, the structure of ontology, and philosophical skepticism. Philosophers will use this fresh treatment of realism and rationalism as a starting point for new directions in their own research.
001386397 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386397 650_0 $$aRealism.
001386397 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/General
001386397 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386397 852__ $$bebk
001386397 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5796.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386397 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001386397 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1386397$$pGLOBAL_SET
001386397 980__ $$aBIB
001386397 980__ $$aEBOOK
001386397 982__ $$aEbook
001386397 983__ $$aOnline