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001386587 035__ $$a(OCoLC)801245664$$z(OCoLC)608120246$$z(OCoLC)990614381$$z(OCoLC)1014408057$$z(OCoLC)1014432571$$z(OCoLC)1014474585$$z(OCoLC)1014484798$$z(OCoLC)1019802182$$z(OCoLC)1032576830$$z(OCoLC)1044407826$$z(OCoLC)1047763275$$z(OCoLC)1056524572$$z(OCoLC)1060865203$$z(OCoLC)1075536637
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001386587 050_4 $$aB105.R4$$bC86 1989
001386587 08204 $$a153$$219
001386587 1001_ $$aCummins, Robert,$$d1944-
001386587 24510 $$aMeaning and mental representation /$$cRobert Cummins.
001386587 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c©1989.
001386587 264_4 $$c©1989
001386587 300__ $$a1 online resource (viii, 180 pages) :$$billustrations.
001386587 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001386587 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001386587 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001386587 4901_ $$aBradford book
001386587 500__ $$a"A Bradford book."
001386587 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001386587 520__ $$aIn this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is, in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the different contexts of commonsense or "folk" psychology, orthodox computation, connectionism, or neuroscience.Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context.A Bradford Book.
001386587 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001386587 650_0 $$aMental representation.
001386587 650_0 $$aMeaning (Philosophy)
001386587 653__ $$aPhilosophy$$aRepresentation
001386587 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001386587 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
001386587 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001386587 852__ $$bebk
001386587 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4516.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001386587 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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