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001387450 020__ $$a9780262284301
001387450 020__ $$a0262284308$$q(E-Book)
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001387450 035__ $$a(OCoLC)961852696
001387450 035__ $$a(OCoLC-P)961852696
001387450 040__ $$aOCoLC-P$$beng$$cOCoLC-P
001387450 050_4 $$aRC553.A84
001387450 08204 $$a154.4$$221
001387450 1001_ $$aStephens, G. Lynn,$$eauthor.
001387450 24510 $$aWhen Self-Consciousness Breaks :$$bAlien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.
001387450 260__ $$aCambridge :$$bMIT Press$$cJan. 2003.
001387450 300__ $$a1 online resource (212 pages).
001387450 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001387450 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001387450 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001387450 4901_ $$aPhilosophical Psychopathology Ser.
001387450 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001387450 5208_ $$aAnnotation$$bIn this book, G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham examine verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of what they call "alienated self-consciousness." In such cases, a subject is directly or introspectively aware of an episode in her mental life but experiences it as alien, as somehow attributable to another person. Stephens and Graham explore two sorts of questions about verbal hallucinations and thought insertion. The first is their phenomenology -- what the experience is like for the subject. The second concerns the implications of alien episodes for our general understanding of self-consciousness. Psychopathologists look at alien episodes for what they reveal about the underlying pathology of mental illness. As philosophers, the authors ask what they reveal about the underlying psychological structure and processes of human self-consciousness. The authors suggest that alien episodes are caused by a disturbed sense of agency, a condition in which the subject no longer has the sense of being the agent who thinks or carries out the thought. Distinguishing the sense of subjectivity from that of agency, they make the case that the sense of agency is a key element in self-consciousness.
001387450 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001387450 650_0 $$aAuditory hallucinations.
001387450 650_0 $$aThought insertion.
001387450 650_0 $$aSelf.
001387450 650_0 $$aSelf-perception.
001387450 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001387450 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/Psychology/Cognitive Psychology
001387450 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001387450 7001_ $$aGraham, George,$$eauthor.
001387450 852__ $$bebk
001387450 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7218.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001387450 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001387450 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1387450$$pGLOBAL_SET
001387450 980__ $$aBIB
001387450 980__ $$aEBOOK
001387450 982__ $$aEbook
001387450 983__ $$aOnline