Reconstructing the cognitive world : the next step / Michael Wheeler.
2005
BD418.3 .W52 2005eb
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Details
Title
Reconstructing the cognitive world : the next step / Michael Wheeler.
Author
Wheeler, Michael, 1960-
ISBN
9780262286039 (electronic bk.)
0262286033 (electronic bk.)
1423726685 (electronic bk.)
9781423726685 (electronic bk.)
0262232405 (alk. paper)
9780262232401 (alk. paper)
9780262731829
0262731827
0262286033 (electronic bk.)
1423726685 (electronic bk.)
9781423726685 (electronic bk.)
0262232405 (alk. paper)
9780262232401 (alk. paper)
9780262731829
0262731827
Publication Details
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2005.
Copyright
©2005
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xi, 340 pages)
Call Number
BD418.3 .W52 2005eb
Dewey Decimal Classification
153
Summary
"In Reconstructing the Cognitive World, Michael Wheeler argues that we should turn away from the generically Cartesian philosophical foundations of much contemporary cognitive science research and proposes instead a Heideggerian approach. Wheeler begins with an interpretation of Descartes. He defines Cartesian psychology as a conceptual framework of explanatory principles and shows how each of these principles is part of the deep assumptions of orthodox cognitive science (both classical and connectionist). Wheeler then turns to Heidegger's radically non-Cartesian account of everyday cognition, which, he argues, can be used to articulate the philosophical foundations of a genuinely non-Cartesian cognitive science."
"Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science."--Jacket.
"Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science."--Jacket.
Note
"A Bradford book."
"Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science."--Jacket.
"Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science."--Jacket.
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