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001387578 1001_ $$aHutto, Daniel D.,$$eauthor.
001387578 24510 $$aEvolving enactivism :$$bbasic minds meet content /$$cDaniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin.
001387578 264_1 $$aCambridge, MA :$$bMIT Press,$$c[2017]
001387578 264_4 $$c©2017
001387578 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxvi, 328 pages).
001387578 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001387578 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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001387578 4901_ $$aThe MIT Press Ser.
001387578 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001387578 5208_ $$aEvolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix.
001387578 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001387578 650_0 $$aPhilosophy of mind.
001387578 650_0 $$aCognitive science.
001387578 650_0 $$aAct (Philosophy)
001387578 650_0 $$aIntentionalism.
001387578 650_0 $$aMental representation.
001387578 650_0 $$aIntentionality (Philosophy)
001387578 650_0 $$aPhenomenology.
001387578 650_0 $$aContent (Psychology)
001387578 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
001387578 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
001387578 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001387578 7001_ $$aMyin, Erik,$$eauthor.
001387578 852__ $$bebk
001387578 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10366.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
001387578 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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