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001404113 020__ $$a9780262280587
001404113 020__ $$a0262280582
001404113 035__ $$a(OCoLC)939263558
001404113 035__ $$a(OCoLC-P)939263558
001404113 040__ $$aOCoLC-P$$beng$$epn$$cOCoLC-P
001404113 050_4 $$aHD2763 -- N45 1999eb
001404113 08204 $$a363.6
001404113 1001_ $$aNewbery, David M.
001404113 24510 $$aPrivatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities.
001404113 260__ $$aCambridge :$$bMIT Press,$$c2015.
001404113 300__ $$a1 online resource (479 pages)
001404113 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001404113 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001404113 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001404113 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001404113 520__ $$aNetwork utilities, such as electricity, telephones, and gas, are public utilities that require a fixed network to deliver their services. Because consumers have no choice of network, they risk exploitation by network owners. Once invested, however, a network's capital is sunk, and the bargaining advantage shifts from investor to consumer. The investor, fearing expropriation, may be reluctant to invest. The tension between consumer and investor can be side-stepped by state ownership. Alternatively, private ownership and consumers' political power can be reconciled through regulation. Either way, network utilities operate under terms set by the state. David Newbery argues that price-setting rules comprise only part of the policy agenda. Network utilities pose special problems of ownership and regulation. He discusses the history of ownership and regulation, privatization, and theories of regulation. Examining three network utilities in detail--telecoms, electricity, and gas--he contrasts the regulatory approaches of Britain and the United States. He also looks at liberalization in a variety of other countries. History shows that the mature forms of regulatory institutions are emarkably similar under both public and private ownership. This raises obvious questions such as: Will the forces that caused convergence to regulated vertical integration in the past reassert themselves? Can the benefits of competition be protected against the pressure to reintegrate? Will different utilities differ in their form and structure? A full understanding of the forces shaping regulatory institutions is necessary to answer these important questions.
001404113 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
001404113 650_0 $$aPublic utilities.
001404113 650_0 $$aPrivatization.
001404113 650_0 $$aPublic utilities$$xGovernment policy.
001404113 653__ $$aINFORMATION SCIENCE/Technology & Policy
001404113 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Industrial Organization
001404113 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001404113 852__ $$bebk$$hProQuest Ebook Central Academic Complete
001404113 85640 $$3ProQuest Ebook Central Academic Complete$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usiricelib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3338433$$zOnline Access
001404113 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
001404113 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:401888$$pGLOBAL_SET
001404113 980__ $$aBIB
001404113 980__ $$aEBOOK
001404113 982__ $$aEbook
001404113 983__ $$aOnline