Public interest and private enterprize: new developments : theoretical results and numerical algorithms / José Guadalupe Flores Muñiz, Nataliya Kalashnykova, Viacheslav V. Kalashnikov, Vladik Kreinovich.
2021
HB145
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Title
Public interest and private enterprize: new developments : theoretical results and numerical algorithms / José Guadalupe Flores Muñiz, Nataliya Kalashnykova, Viacheslav V. Kalashnikov, Vladik Kreinovich.
ISBN
9783030583491 (electronic bk.)
303058349X (electronic bk.)
3030583481
9783030583484
303058349X (electronic bk.)
3030583481
9783030583484
Publication Details
Cham : Springer, 2021.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (149 pages)
Item Number
10.1007/978-3-030-58349-1 doi
Call Number
HB145
Dewey Decimal Classification
339.5
Summary
This book deals with the effect of public and semi-public companies on economy. In traditional economic models, several private companies - interested in maximizing their profit - interact (e.g., compete) with each other. Such models help to avoid wild oscillation in production and prices (typical for uncontrolled competition), and to come up with a stable equilibrium solution. The problems become very complex if we take into account the presence of public and semi-public companies - that are interested in public good as well as in the profit. The book contains theoretical results and numerical techniques for computing resulting equilibria. As a case study, it considers the problem of selecting optimal tolls for the public roads - tolls that best balance the public good and the need to recover the cost of building the roads. It is recommended to specialists in economics as well as to students interested in learning the corresponding economic models.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Digital File Characteristics
text file
PDF
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed November 30, 2020).
Series
Lecture notes in networks and systems ; v. 138.
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Table of Contents
Introduction
Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in a semi-mixed duopoly
Consistent conjectural variations coincide with the Nash solution in the meta-model
Bilevel tolls optimization problem with quadratic costs.
Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in a semi-mixed duopoly
Consistent conjectural variations coincide with the Nash solution in the meta-model
Bilevel tolls optimization problem with quadratic costs.