Tournament design : how operations research can improve sports rules / László Csató.
Csató, László, author.
2021
GV731 .C73 2020
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Title Tournament design : how operations research can improve sports rules / László Csató.
Author Csató, László, author.
ISBN 9783030598440 (electronic bk.)
3030598446 (electronic bk.)
9783030598433
3030598438
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59844-0
Published Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
Language English
Description 1 online resource
Item Number 10.1007/978-3-030-59844-0 doi
Call Number GV731 .C73 2020
Dewey Decimal Classification 796
Summary This Palgrave Pivot presents tournament design mainly within the axioms of incentive compatibility and fairness. It illustrates the advantages of an axiomatic approach through various examples, including several FIFA and UEFA tournaments, and uses theoretical tools and simulation methodology in its analysis. Chapter 1 discusses scoring systems of championships with multiple competitions, ranking in Swiss-system tournaments, and tie-breaking rules in round-robin leagues. It is followed by a thorough critical analysis of the current and previous FIFA World Rankings. The broad focus is substantially narrowed in Chapter 2, which turns to the topic of incentive (in)compatibility in multiple qualifiers. It is revealed that UEFA has faced at least three times recently this problem in the qualification to the UEFA Europa League, qualification to the UEFA Champions League, and the draw of the UEFA Champions League groups. Analogously, Chapter 3 discusses incentive (in)compatibility when there is only one group-based tournament but the complex progression rules to the subsequent stage can be designed poorly. Our examples include the qualifying tournaments of recent FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships. Chapter 4 moves to the problem of penalty shootout rules in soccer, where the fairness and complexity of some alternative mechanisms from the literature are evaluated. Fairness remains the central issue in Chapter 5, which presents the challenges of designing a tournament with 24 teams if the number of teams per group cannot exceed four. As expected, there is no perfect solution, and both FIFA and UEFA have introduced a reform in this format recently. Chapter 6 deals with the qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship. Its tournament design is perhaps the most complicated one that has ever been implemented in the real-world and suffers from serious shortcomings. László Csató is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Computer Science and Control (SZTAKI), Hungary, and a Senior Lecturer at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.
Bibliography, etc. Note Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
Series Palgrave Pivots in sports economics.
Available in Other Form Print version: 9783030598440
Print version: 3030598438
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Introduction
1. Topics in tournament ranking
2. Incentive (in)compatibility: multiple qualifiers
3. Incentive (in)compatibility: group-based tournaments
4. Soccer penalty shootouts: complexity versus fairness
5. Soccer tournaments with 24 teams: problems and solutions
6. Three controversial issues in the qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Championship
Conclusion.

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