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001433961 001__ 1433961
001433961 003__ OCoLC
001433961 005__ 20230309003702.0
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001433961 019__ $$a1237866013$$a1244117712
001433961 020__ $$a9783030625252$$q(electronic bk.)
001433961 020__ $$a3030625257$$q(electronic bk.)
001433961 020__ $$z3030625249$$q(hardcover)
001433961 020__ $$z9783030625245$$q(hardcover)
001433961 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2$$2doi
001433961 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1237525959
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001433961 049__ $$aISEA
001433961 050_4 $$aK877$$b.H64 2021
001433961 08204 $$a346.022$$223
001433961 1001_ $$aHofmann, Oliver,$$eauthor.
001433961 24510 $$aBreach of contract :$$ban economic analysis of the efficient breach scenario /$$cOliver Hofmann.
001433961 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer,$$c[2021]
001433961 300__ $$a1 online resource
001433961 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001433961 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001433961 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001433961 347__ $$atext file
001433961 347__ $$bPDF
001433961 4901_ $$aInternational law and economics
001433961 500__ $$aTitle from digital title page (viewed on March 11, 2021).
001433961 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
001433961 5050_ $$aIntroduction -- Breach or perform decision: The traditional model of the efficient breach -- Distributional effects and the original contract -- The option to cover -- Over- and undercompensation -- Incomplete information -- Transaction costs -- Conclusion.
001433961 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001433961 520__ $$a"Efficient breach" is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined
001433961 650_0 $$aBreach of contract.
001433961 650_0 $$aBreach of contract$$xEconomic aspects.
001433961 650_6 $$aInexécution.
001433961 650_6 $$aInexécution$$xAspect économique.
001433961 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001433961 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aHofmann, Oliver.$$tBreach of contract.$$dCham, Switzerland : Sprinter, [2021]$$z3030625249$$w(OCoLC)1197844355
001433961 830_0 $$aInternational law and economics (Springer (Firm))
001433961 852__ $$bebk
001433961 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001433961 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1433961$$pGLOBAL_SET
001433961 980__ $$aBIB
001433961 980__ $$aEBOOK
001433961 982__ $$aEbook
001433961 983__ $$aOnline
001433961 994__ $$a92$$bISE