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001434004 020__ $$a9783030541163$$q(electronic bk.)
001434004 020__ $$a3030541169$$q(electronic bk.)
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001434004 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3$$2doi
001434004 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1237849477
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001434004 049__ $$aISEA
001434004 050_4 $$aB1649.S264$$bR48 2021
001434004 08204 $$a191$$223
001434004 08204 $$a123$$223
001434004 24500 $$aRevisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is" /$$cPaolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi, editors.
001434004 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c[2021]
001434004 300__ $$a1 online resource
001434004 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001434004 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001434004 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001434004 347__ $$atext file
001434004 347__ $$bPDF
001434004 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
001434004 5050_ $$aChapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle -- Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi -- Part 2 -- Chapter 3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S. Alves -- Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech Zeaniec -- Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio -- Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer -- Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli -- Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte -- Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi -- Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia -- Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette -- Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks -- Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Wolenski -- Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Zauski -- Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi.
001434004 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001434004 520__ $$aThis book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle's 1964 article How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"' sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is"--It simply follows that you 'ought' to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein's philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle's essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought."
001434004 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 24, 2021).
001434004 60010 $$aSearle, John R.
001434004 650_0 $$aIntentionality (Philosophy)
001434004 650_0 $$aPossibility.
001434004 650_6 $$aIntentionnalité (Philosophie)
001434004 650_6 $$aPossibilité.
001434004 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001434004 7001_ $$aDi Lucia, Paolo,$$eeditor.
001434004 7001_ $$aFittipaldi, Edoardo,$$eeditor.
001434004 77608 $$iPrint version:$$tRevisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is".$$dCham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2021]$$z9783030541156$$z3030541150$$w(OCoLC)1203010185
001434004 852__ $$bebk
001434004 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001434004 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1434004$$pGLOBAL_SET
001434004 980__ $$aBIB
001434004 980__ $$aEBOOK
001434004 982__ $$aEbook
001434004 983__ $$aOnline
001434004 994__ $$a92$$bISE