Legal certainty and central bank autonomy in Latin American emerging markets / Andrea Lucia Tapia-Hoffmann.
2021
KG262
Linked e-resources
Linked Resource
Concurrent users
Unlimited
Authorized users
Authorized users
Document Delivery Supplied
Can lend chapters, not whole ebooks
Details
Title
Legal certainty and central bank autonomy in Latin American emerging markets / Andrea Lucia Tapia-Hoffmann.
ISBN
9783030709860 (electronic bk.)
3030709868 (electronic bk.)
303070985X
9783030709853
3030709868 (electronic bk.)
303070985X
9783030709853
Published
Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2021]
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xxiii, 273 pages) : illustrations
Item Number
10.1007/978-3-030-70986-0 doi
Call Number
KG262
Dewey Decimal Classification
343.807
332.1/12
332.1/12
Summary
This book provides a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of six Latin American central banks to determine whether there is legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy. Based on this, it ascertains whether the way in which legal institutions are designed -- specifically those that rule the autonomy of the central bank -- provides reasons to believe that central banks can keep inflation at bay even if governments face fiscal problems or pursue contradictory objectives. The analysis covers three key areas: a constitutional analysis, a detailed study of the central bank statutes and a study of a number of underexplored threats to central bank autonomy. After defining and identifying different types of legal certainty and linking them to the credibility of government promises, the author goes on to examine the grounds that the law provides for confidence that central banks operate independently of political influence. The second part of the book focuses on a granular analysis of the legal design of the central banks' objectives and autonomy. Lastly, the third part features two case studies that represent little-known and unusual institutional threats to legal certainty relating to central bank autonomy, such as the interventions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in the autonomy of the Colombian central bank, and the interventions of the Argentinean executive and legislative branches in the autonomy of Argentina's central bank through stabilization plans introduced via emergency laws and decrees. In sum, the book suggests that there are serious doubts about the ability of Latin American central banks to maintain price stability over time. Although central banks were granted a degree of autonomy, authorities in Latin American countries are able to affect central bank decisions. Most importantly, a lack of clarity, inconsistencies, or generous exceptions in the law provide ways for authorities to influence central banks even without bending or disregarding the rules.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed May 10, 2021).
Series
European yearbook of international economic law. EYIEL monographs ; v. 15. 2524-6658
Available in Other Form
Print version: 9783030709853
Linked Resources
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Legal Certainty
3 Legal Certainty and Legal Commitment Mechanisms
4 Central Bank Objectives and Autonomy
5 Central Bank Statutes and Autonomy
The Constitutional Court of Colombia versus Central Bank Autonomy
7 Economic Emergency and Central Bank Autonomy in Argentina
8 Towards Monetary Stability in Latin America.
2 Legal Certainty
3 Legal Certainty and Legal Commitment Mechanisms
4 Central Bank Objectives and Autonomy
5 Central Bank Statutes and Autonomy
The Constitutional Court of Colombia versus Central Bank Autonomy
7 Economic Emergency and Central Bank Autonomy in Argentina
8 Towards Monetary Stability in Latin America.