Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia.
2021
HB172
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Title
Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia.
Author
ISBN
9783030695750 (electronic bk.)
3030695751 (electronic bk.)
3030695743
9783030695743
3030695751 (electronic bk.)
3030695743
9783030695743
Publication Details
Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2021.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource
Item Number
10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0 doi
Call Number
HB172
Dewey Decimal Classification
338.5
Summary
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidder' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph. D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed June 4, 2021).
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Series
Springer texts in business and economics, 2192-4333
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Second-price auctions
Chapter 2: First-price auctions
Chapter 3: First-price auctions, Extensions
Chapter 4: All-pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
Chapter 5: Third-price auctions, kth-price auctions, and lotteries
Chapter 6: The Revenue Equivalence principle
Chapter 7: Common-value auctions
Chapter 8: Multi-unit auctions
Chapter 9: Mechanism design
Chapter 10: Procurement auctions
Game Theory Appendix
References.
Chapter 2: First-price auctions
Chapter 3: First-price auctions, Extensions
Chapter 4: All-pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
Chapter 5: Third-price auctions, kth-price auctions, and lotteries
Chapter 6: The Revenue Equivalence principle
Chapter 7: Common-value auctions
Chapter 8: Multi-unit auctions
Chapter 9: Mechanism design
Chapter 10: Procurement auctions
Game Theory Appendix
References.