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Title
Rethinking Descartes's substance dualism / Lynda Gaudemard.
ISBN
9783030754143 (electronic bk.)
3030754146 (electronic bk.)
9783030754136
3030754138
Published
Cham : Springer, [2021]
Copyright
©2021
Language
English
Description
1 online resource
Other Standard Identifiers
10.1007/978-3-030-75414-3 doi
Call Number
B1878.D82 G38 2021
Dewey Decimal Classification
147/.4
Summary
This monograph presents an interpretation of Descartes's dualism, which differs from the standard reading called 'classical separatist dualism' claiming that the mind can exist without the body. It argues that, contrary to what it is commonly claimed, Descartes' texts suggest an emergent creationist substance dualism, according to which the mind is a nonphysical substance (created and maintained by God), which cannot begin to think without a well-disposed body. According to this interpretation, God's laws of nature endow each human body with the power to be united to an immaterial soul. While the soul does not directly come from the body, the mind can be said to emerge from the body in the sense that it cannot be created by God independently from the body. The divine creation of a human mind requires a well-disposed body, a physical categorical basis. This kind of emergentism is consistent with creationism and does not necessarily entail that the mind cannot survive the body. This early modern view has some connections with Hasker's substance emergent dualism (1999). Indeed, Hasker states that the mind is a substance emerging at one time from neurons and that consciousness has causal powers which effects cannot be explained by physical neurons. An emergent unified self-existing entity emerges from the brain on which it acts upon. For its proponents, Hasker's view explains what Descartes' dualism fails to explain, especially why the mind regularly interacts with one and only one body. After questioning the notion of emergence, the author argues that the theory of emergent creationist substance dualism that she attributes to Descartes is a more appropriate alternative because it faces fewer problems than its rivals. This monograph is valuable for anyone interested in the history of early modern philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed September 15, 2021).
Series
Studies in the history of philosophy of mind ; v. 29. 2542-9922
Introduction-Why substance dualism is not over
PART I CHALLENGING THE CARTESIAN MIND PARADIGM (COMPLETED)
Chapter 1 Descartes' argument for substance dualism
Chapter 2 The modal distinction between mind and imagination
Chapter 3 Imagination as an essential property of the human mind
PART II THE CARTESIAN HUMAN BODY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SELF
Chapter 4 Notions of emergence
Chapter 5 Contemporary versions of substance emergent dualism
Chapter 6 A "well disposed" human body : Descartes' emergent substance dualism
Chapter 7 Two kinds of extension
Conclusion-Descartes' legacy
Bibliography
Index.
