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001439715 001__ 1439715
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001439715 019__ $$a1268573880
001439715 020__ $$a9783030859473$$q(electronic bk.)
001439715 020__ $$a3030859479$$q(electronic bk.)
001439715 020__ $$z9783030859466
001439715 020__ $$z3030859460
001439715 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3$$2doi
001439715 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1268327155
001439715 040__ $$aYDX$$beng$$erda$$epn$$cYDX$$dGW5XE$$dOCLCO$$dDKU$$dEBLCP$$dOCLCF$$dN$T$$dOCLCQ$$dOCLCO$$dOCLCQ
001439715 049__ $$aISEA
001439715 050_4 $$aQA269$$b.S34 2021
001439715 08204 $$a519.3$$223
001439715 1112_ $$aSAGT (Symposium)$$n(14th :$$d2021 :$$cOnline)
001439715 24510 $$aAlgorithmic game theory :$$b14th international symposium, SAGT 2021. Aarhus, Denmark, September 21-24, 2021 : proceedings /$$cIoannis Caragiannis, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen (eds.).
001439715 24630 $$aSAGT 2021
001439715 264_1 $$aCham :$$bSpringer,$$c[2021]
001439715 264_4 $$c©2021
001439715 300__ $$a1 online resource :$$billustrations (some color)
001439715 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001439715 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001439715 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001439715 347__ $$atext file
001439715 347__ $$bPDF
001439715 4901_ $$aLecture notes in computer science ;$$v12885
001439715 4901_ $$aLNCS sublibrary: SL3 - Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web and HCI
001439715 500__ $$aInternational conference proceedings.
001439715 500__ $$aIncludes author index.
001439715 5050_ $$aAuctions and Mechanism Design -- Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming -- The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions -- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation -- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location -- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values -- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection -- Computational Aspects of Games -- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents -- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms -- Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts -- Algorithmic Challenges in Information Design XVII -- On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games -- Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures -- Markets and Matchings -- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching -- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets -- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget -- Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets -- The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences -- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality? -- Social Choice and Cooperative Games -- Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information -- Hedonic Expertise Games -- When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores -- Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values -- An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy -- Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers -- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees -- Abstracts -- On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools -- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap -- Vote Delegation and Misbehavio.
001439715 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001439715 520__ $$aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.* The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games. * The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
001439715 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed September 21, 2021).
001439715 650_0 $$aGame theory$$vCongresses.
001439715 650_0 $$aAlgorithms$$vCongresses.
001439715 650_6 $$aThéorie des jeux$$vCongrès.
001439715 650_6 $$aAlgorithmes$$vCongrès.
001439715 655_7 $$aConference papers and proceedings.$$2fast$$0(OCoLC)fst01423772
001439715 655_7 $$aConference papers and proceedings.$$2lcgft
001439715 655_7 $$aActes de congrès.$$2rvmgf
001439715 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001439715 7001_ $$aCaragiannis, Ioannis,$$eeditor.
001439715 7001_ $$aHansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt,$$eeditor.
001439715 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z3030859460$$z9783030859466$$w(OCoLC)1262966253
001439715 830_0 $$aLecture notes in computer science ;$$v12885.
001439715 830_0 $$aLNCS sublibrary.$$nSL 3,$$pInformation systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI.
001439715 852__ $$bebk
001439715 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001439715 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1439715$$pGLOBAL_SET
001439715 980__ $$aBIB
001439715 980__ $$aEBOOK
001439715 982__ $$aEbook
001439715 983__ $$aOnline
001439715 994__ $$a92$$bISE