001440076 000__ 03332cam\a2200529\a\4500
001440076 001__ 1440076
001440076 003__ OCoLC
001440076 005__ 20230309004540.0
001440076 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\
001440076 007__ cr\un\nnnunnun
001440076 008__ 211002s2021\\\\si\\\\\\ob\\\\001\0\eng\d
001440076 019__ $$a1272996000$$a1273077922$$a1273123004
001440076 020__ $$a9789811635175$$q(electronic bk.)
001440076 020__ $$a981163517X$$q(electronic bk.)
001440076 020__ $$z9789811635168$$q(hardcover)
001440076 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5$$2doi
001440076 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1272956511
001440076 040__ $$aYDX$$beng$$epn$$cYDX$$dGW5XE$$dUKMGB$$dEBLCP$$dOCLCF$$dUIU$$dUKAHL$$dOCLCO$$dN$T$$dOCLCQ$$dOCLCO$$dVLB$$dOCLCQ
001440076 049__ $$aISEA
001440076 050_4 $$aBD418.3$$b.R56 2021eb
001440076 08204 $$a128/.2$$223
001440076 1001_ $$aRimell, Nicholas.
001440076 24510 $$aRepresentational content and the objects of thought /$$cNicholas Rimell.
001440076 264_1 $$aSingapore :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c2021.
001440076 264_4 $$c©2021
001440076 300__ $$a1 online resource (xiii, 215 pages)
001440076 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001440076 336__ $$astill image$$bsti$$2rdacontent
001440076 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001440076 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001440076 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
001440076 50500 $$tIntroduction --$$tNarrow Representational Content --$$tNarrow Content and Propositions --$$tPrivate propositions --$$tWhy We Cannot Think about Nonexistents --$$tAgainst Necessary Existence --$$tConclusion.
001440076 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001440076 520__ $$aIt is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a beliefs truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. First, our beliefs have private contentcontent that only a single subject can entertain. Second, it is impossible to think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus, the fountain of youth). In light of the latter claim, Rimell offers an error theory meant to explain what we are doing when we think were thinking about nonexistents. To non-specialists, this book serves as a clear, careful introduction to central questions at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind: Are thought and meaning entirely in the head? Whats special about first-personal thought and speech? How (if at all) can we think about nonexistents, given that prima facie thinking involves a relation between a subject and an object of thought? To specialists, this book is designed to challenge the standard ways of thinking about these questions and to offer a unified response to them.
001440076 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
001440076 650_0 $$aPhilosophy of mind.
001440076 650_0 $$aCognitive psychology.
001440076 650_6 $$aPhilosophie de l'esprit.
001440076 650_6 $$aPsychologie cognitive.
001440076 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001440076 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aRimell, Nicholas.$$tRepresentational content and the objects of thought.$$dSingapore : Palgrave Macmillan, [2021]$$z9789811635168$$w(OCoLC)1250511240
001440076 852__ $$bebk
001440076 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001440076 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1440076$$pGLOBAL_SET
001440076 980__ $$aBIB
001440076 980__ $$aEBOOK
001440076 982__ $$aEbook
001440076 983__ $$aOnline
001440076 994__ $$a92$$bISE