Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling
Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks
Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights
Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model
Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination
Preference Elicitation
Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?
Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees
Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals
Preference Aggregation and Voting
In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters
Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences
Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.-Manipulation in Voting
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games
Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams
The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules
Fair Division and Resource Allocation
Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs
On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods
On Reachable Assignments in Cycles
Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average
Algorithmic Decision Theory
Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints
Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model
Coalition Formation
Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice
Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited
Stable Matchings
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching
Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information
Participatory Budgeting
Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules
Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting.