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001443959 001__ 1443959
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001443959 019__ $$a1296665899
001443959 020__ $$a9783030946760$$q(electronic bk.)
001443959 020__ $$a3030946762$$q(electronic bk.)
001443959 020__ $$z9783030946753
001443959 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0$$2doi
001443959 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1293984288
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001443959 049__ $$aISEA
001443959 050_4 $$aQA76.9.A43$$bW56 2021
001443959 08204 $$a005.1$$223
001443959 1112_ $$aWine Conference$$n(17th :$$d2021 :$$cOnline)
001443959 24510 $$aWeb and internet economics :$$b17th international conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021 : proceedings /$$cMichal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen (eds.).
001443959 24630 $$aWINE 2021
001443959 250__ $$a1st ed. 2022.
001443959 264_1 $$aCham :$$bSpringer,$$c[2022]
001443959 264_4 $$c©2022
001443959 300__ $$a1 online resource (xiv, 558 pages) :$$billustrations (chiefly color).
001443959 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001443959 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001443959 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001443959 347__ $$atext file$$bPDF$$2rda
001443959 4901_ $$aLecture notes in computer science ;$$v13112
001443959 4901_ $$aLNCS sublibrary: SL3 - Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
001443959 500__ $$aInternational conference proceedings.
001443959 500__ $$aIncludes author index.
001443959 5050_ $$aMechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.
001443959 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001443959 520__ $$aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
001443959 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed January 28, 2022).
001443959 650_0 $$aInternet$$xEconomic aspects$$vCongresses.
001443959 650_0 $$aComputer networks$$xEconomic aspects$$vCongresses.
001443959 650_0 $$aElectronic commerce$$vCongresses.
001443959 650_0 $$aGame theory$$vCongresses.
001443959 650_6 $$aInternet$$xAspect économique$$vCongrès.
001443959 650_6 $$aRéseaux d'ordinateurs$$xAspect économique$$vCongrès.
001443959 650_6 $$aCommerce électronique$$vCongrès.
001443959 650_6 $$aThéorie des jeux$$vCongrès.
001443959 655_7 $$aConference papers and proceedings.$$2fast$$0(OCoLC)fst01423772
001443959 655_7 $$aConference papers and proceedings.$$2lcgft
001443959 655_7 $$aActes de congrès.$$2rvmgf
001443959 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001443959 7001_ $$aFeldman, Michal,$$eeditor.
001443959 7001_ $$aFu, Hu,$$eeditor.
001443959 7001_ $$aTalgam-Cohen, Inbal,$$eeditor.
001443959 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z9783030946753
001443959 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z9783030946777
001443959 830_0 $$aLecture notes in computer science ;$$v13112.
001443959 830_0 $$aLNCS sublibrary.$$nSL 3,$$pInformation systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI.
001443959 852__ $$bebk
001443959 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001443959 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1443959$$pGLOBAL_SET
001443959 980__ $$aBIB
001443959 980__ $$aEBOOK
001443959 982__ $$aEbook
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