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Details
Table of Contents
Intro
Preface
Organization
Invited Talks
How Private is Secure Messaging?
Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth Based Contact Tracing-One Size Does Not Fit All
Contents
Privacy and Applications
On Evaluating Anonymity of Onion Routing
1 Introduction
2 High-Level Framework/Execution Environment
3 Security Goals and Notions
3.1 Interpreting Privacy Notions
3.2 A Taxonomy of Security Goals
4 Metrics
4.1 Input-Dependent Metrics
4.2 Output-Dependent Metrics
5 Adversarial Threat Model
6 Application of Our Framework
7 Conclusion
References
Revisiting Driver Anonymity in ORide
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Contribution
2 Analysis of ORide Protocol
2.1 ORide: A Privacy-Preserving Ride Hailing Service
2.2 ORide: Threat Model
2.3 Attack: Predicting Driver Locations
2.4 Implementation of Our Attack
2.5 Impact and Consequences of Our Attack
3 Mitigation of Our Attack
3.1 Anonymizing Driver Locations
3.2 Anonymity of Drivers with Respect to Rider
3.3 Accuracy of Ride-Matching
4 Related Works
5 Conclusion
A Appendix: Further Attacks
A.1 Homomorphic Noise Addition by SP
A.2 p-norm Metric by SP
3 Tom Curves
4 Proof of Point Addition
5 Proof of Scalar Multiplication
6 Proof of Knowledge of ECDSA Signature
7 Applications
7.1 Ring Signatures
7.2 Group Signatures
7.3 Non-revocation
8 Implementation
9 Related Work
10 Conclusion
References
Implementation, PUFs and MPC
A Low-Randomness Second-Order Masked AES
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Bounded-Query Probing Model
2.2 Boolean Masking and Threshold Implementations
2.3 Changing of the Guards
2.4 Cryptanalysis of Higher-Order Threshold Implementations
3 A Low-Randomness Second-Order Secure AES
3.1 Masking Details
3.2 Optimizing the S-Box Sharing
3.3 Guards in Formation
4 Security Analysis
4.1 Single Round
4.2 Multiple Rounds
4.3 Security Claim
5 Sharpening the Glitch Model
6 Amortizing Randomness Over Multiple Queries
7 Conclusion
A Trails in the Second-Order Masked Key Schedule
B Walsh Spectra of the AES and XOR
C Trails in the Second-Order Masked State
D Trails in the Generation of Randomness
References
How Do the Arbiter PUFs Sample the Boolean Function Class?
1 Introduction
Preface
Organization
Invited Talks
How Private is Secure Messaging?
Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth Based Contact Tracing-One Size Does Not Fit All
Contents
Privacy and Applications
On Evaluating Anonymity of Onion Routing
1 Introduction
2 High-Level Framework/Execution Environment
3 Security Goals and Notions
3.1 Interpreting Privacy Notions
3.2 A Taxonomy of Security Goals
4 Metrics
4.1 Input-Dependent Metrics
4.2 Output-Dependent Metrics
5 Adversarial Threat Model
6 Application of Our Framework
7 Conclusion
References
Revisiting Driver Anonymity in ORide
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Contribution
2 Analysis of ORide Protocol
2.1 ORide: A Privacy-Preserving Ride Hailing Service
2.2 ORide: Threat Model
2.3 Attack: Predicting Driver Locations
2.4 Implementation of Our Attack
2.5 Impact and Consequences of Our Attack
3 Mitigation of Our Attack
3.1 Anonymizing Driver Locations
3.2 Anonymity of Drivers with Respect to Rider
3.3 Accuracy of Ride-Matching
4 Related Works
5 Conclusion
A Appendix: Further Attacks
A.1 Homomorphic Noise Addition by SP
A.2 p-norm Metric by SP
3 Tom Curves
4 Proof of Point Addition
5 Proof of Scalar Multiplication
6 Proof of Knowledge of ECDSA Signature
7 Applications
7.1 Ring Signatures
7.2 Group Signatures
7.3 Non-revocation
8 Implementation
9 Related Work
10 Conclusion
References
Implementation, PUFs and MPC
A Low-Randomness Second-Order Masked AES
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Bounded-Query Probing Model
2.2 Boolean Masking and Threshold Implementations
2.3 Changing of the Guards
2.4 Cryptanalysis of Higher-Order Threshold Implementations
3 A Low-Randomness Second-Order Secure AES
3.1 Masking Details
3.2 Optimizing the S-Box Sharing
3.3 Guards in Formation
4 Security Analysis
4.1 Single Round
4.2 Multiple Rounds
4.3 Security Claim
5 Sharpening the Glitch Model
6 Amortizing Randomness Over Multiple Queries
7 Conclusion
A Trails in the Second-Order Masked Key Schedule
B Walsh Spectra of the AES and XOR
C Trails in the Second-Order Masked State
D Trails in the Generation of Randomness
References
How Do the Arbiter PUFs Sample the Boolean Function Class?
1 Introduction