Ockhamism and philosophy of time : semantic and metaphysical issues concerning future contingents / Alessio Santelli, editor.
Santelli, Alessio, editor.
2022
BD638
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Title Ockhamism and philosophy of time : semantic and metaphysical issues concerning future contingents / Alessio Santelli, editor.
ISBN 9783030903596 (electronic bk.)
3030903591 (electronic bk.)
3030903583
9783030903589
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90359-6
Imprint Cham : Springer, 2022.
Language English
Description 1 online resource (176 pages)
Other Standard Identifiers 10.1007/978-3-030-90359-6 doi
Call Number BD638
Dewey Decimal Classification 149.1
Summary This book discusses fundamental topics on contemporary Ockhamism. The collected essays show how contemporary Ockhamism can impact areas of research such as semantics, metaphysics and also the philosophy of science. In addition, the volume hosts one historian of Medieval philosophy who investigates the way in which William of Ockham "in flesh and bone" construed time and, more generally, future contingency. The essays explore the different meanings of this theory. They cover three main topics, in particular. The first examines the thesis that sentences and propositions about the future have a definite truth value, without any ensuing commitment to determinism or fatalism. The second topic looks at the problem whether the branching-time model needs to countenance a privileged branch (the so-called Thin Red Line). Finally, the third topic considers the idea that there are so-called soft facts. These would be the subject matter of sentences and propositions verbally about the present or the past, but metaphysically about a later time, and which might change in the future. Overall, the book provides an updated and rigorous idea of the debate about Ockhamism. It gives readers a deeper understanding into this philosophical approach influenced by William of Ockham, characterized by the rejection of the Aristotelian idea that, in order to preserve the contingency of the future, future contingents must be deemed neither true nor false
Note 9.4 Indeterminacy and the Open Future in DRM.
Bibliography, etc. Note References-5 Future Contingents in a Branching Universe-5.1 Introduction-5.2 The Branching Approach to Indeterminism-5.3 Three Elaborations of the Branching Approach-5.4 Future-Directed Illocutions and the "Assertion Problem"-5.5 The Assertion Problem Defused-5.6 Future-Directed Illocutions and Creditworthiness-5.7 Future-Directed Illocutions and Assertoric Norms-References-6 A Too Thin True Future: The Problem of Grounding Within Presentist TRL Semantics-6.1 Introduction-6.2 The Grounding Problem-6.2.1 Correspondence-6.2.2 Truthmaking
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed April 8, 2022).
Added Author Santelli, Alessio, editor.
Series Synthese library ; v. 452.
Available in Other Form Ockhamism and Philosophy of Time.
Linked Resources Online Access
Record Appears in Online Resources > Ebooks
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Intro
Preface
Contents
About the Editor
1 From William of Ockham to Contemporary Ockhamism and Back Again: An Overview
References
2 Ockham on Time
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Permanent and Successive Things
2.3 Ontological Problems with Successive Things
2.4 Successive Things and the Razor-Principle
2.5 Reductionism of Change and Time to Permanent Things
References
3 Ockhamistic Inspiration in Modern Tense-Logic
3.1 The Analysis of Future Contingents in Terms of Three-Valued Logic

3.2 Ockham's Rejection of the Argument from Divine Foreknowledge to Determinism
3.3 Ockham's Notion of Time and the Idea of a Thin Red Line
3.4 The Possible Use of Ockham's Ideas in Modern Tense-Logic
3.5 Conclusion
References
4 Ockhamism Without Molinism
4.1 Branching Time and Prior's Ockhamism
4.2 ``True'' Ockhamism and the Molinist Objection
4.3 Ockhamism Defended
4.4 Counterfactuals
4.5 Homogeneous Theories of Future Contingents
4.5.1 Anti-Molinist Anti-Ockhamism
4.5.2 Non-Molinist Non-Ockhamism
4.5.3 Molinist Ockhamism
4.6 Ockhamism Without Molinism

6.3 Grounding and Presentism
6.4 Toward the Future(s)
6.5 A Too Thin True Future
6.5.1 The Argument Against TRL Presentism
6.5.2 A Possible Presentist Answer
6.6 Conclusion
References
7 Presentism, Ockhamism, and Truth-Grounding
7.1 The Grounding Problem for Presentism
7.2 The Nuclear Option
7.3 Nefarious vs Upstanding Presentism
7.4 The Revolutionary Strategy
7.5 Ockhamism
7.6 Ockhamists on the Revolutionary Road
7.7 Conclusion
References
8 The Metaphysics of Ockhamism
8.1 Preliminary Clarifications
8.2 Presentism and the Growing Block Theory

8.3 The Shrinking Block Theory and Eternalism
8.4 Branching and Divergence
8.5 Three Ways to Understand the Openness of the Future
8.6 Other Definitions
References
9 The Metaphysics of Passage in Dynamical Reduction Models of Quantum Mechanics
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Dynamical Reduction Models of Quantum Mechanics
9.2.1 The GRW Framework
9.2.2 The World According to GRW
9.2.3 The Relativistic Extensions of GRW
9.3 Callender's Objections to Quantum Becoming
9.3.1 Indeterminism and Openness in DRM
9.3.2 Passage and the Ontology of Superpositions

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