Intro
Preface
General Introduction: The Problem of A Priori Knowledge
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Author
Part I Kant, Quine and Putnam on The A Priori
Chapter 1: Kant's Views on A Priori Knowledge
1.1 Kant's Main Concern in the Critique
1.2 Is There A Priori Knowledge? How Is A Priori Knowledge Possible?
1.3 What Does "A Priori" Mean? Does "A Priori" Mean "Precedence in Time"?
1.4 Was Kant an Innatist?
1.5 Necessity and Universality as the Criteria of A Priori Knowledge
1.6 On Kant's Conception of Necessity

1.7 Is Kant's Definition of A Prioricity a Purely Negative One? Did Kant Succeed in Characterizing Both A Priori Knowledge and the Class of A Priori Truths?
1.8 Does A Priori Knowledge Involve Some Sort of Infallibility?
1.8.1 Kant's Views
1.8.2 Kitcher's and Friedman's Views on Kant
1.9 Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: Quine's Views on A Priori Knowledge
2.1 The Problem of A Priori Knowledge
2.2 Quine's Empiricist Attack on the Notion of A Priori Knowledge
2.3 Does Quine Distinguish Between the Notions of A Prioricity and Analyticity?

2.3.1 Quine's View of A Prioricity Before "Two Dogmas"
2.4 How to Understand Revision of A Priori Statements? Can A Priori Statements Be Falsifiable by Experience?
2.5 Can Epistemological Holism Be Reconciled with the Belief in A Prioricity?
2.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Putnam's Views on A Priori Knowledge
3.1 Putnam in "'Two Dogmas' Revisited"
3.2 Putnam in "There Is At Least One A Priori Truth"
3.3 Putnam in "Analyticity and Apriority"
3.4 Putnam in "Possibility and Necessity"
3.5 Some Remarks on "'Two Dogmas' Revisited"

3.6 Some Remarks on "There Is At Least One A Priori Truth"
3.7 Some Remarks on "Analyticity and Apriority"
3.8 Some Remarks on "Possibility and Necessity"
3.9 Conclusion
Conclusion of Part I
References
Part II Hale's Views on A Priori Knowledge and Revision
Chapter 4: Hale's General Epistemological Views Regarding A Priori Knowledge
Chapter 5: Kitcher's Views on A Priori Knowledge
5.1 Kitcher's Account of the Notion of A Priori Knowledge
5.2 On Kitcher's Thesis That A Priori Knowledge Is Incompatible with Revision
5.3 The Issue of Long Proofs or Calculations

5.4 Knowledge Obtained by "Non-empirical Processes"
5.5 Some Remarks on Kitcher's Views
Chapter 6: Hale's Reactions to Kitcher's Views
6.1 Hale's Claim That A Priori Knowledge Is Compatible with Revision
6.2 The Issue of Long Proofs Again and the Role of Memory
6.3 Some Remarks on Hale's Attack on Kitcher
6.4 Hale's Remarks on Kant
6.5 Some Remarks on the Role of Memory in Our Acquisition of A Priori Knowledge
Chapter 7: "Pure" Hale and Related Issues
7.1 Revision and Defeasibility of Items of A Priori Knowledge
7.1.1 Casullos's Interpretation of Hale's Views