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Table of Contents
Intro
Preface
Organization
Abstracts of Invited Talks
New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items
Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems
Algorithmic Game Theory Meets Behavioral Economics
Contents
Invited Talk
Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems
1 Introduction
2 Fundamental Characteristics of Resource Based Systems
3 Resource-Based Participation
4 Tokenomics
5 Decentralized Service Provision
6 Rewards Sharing
7 A High-Level Blueprint for a Stake-Based System
8 Concluding Remarks
References
Auctions, Markets and Mechanism Design
How Bad is the Merger Paradox?
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Results
1.2 Related Work
2 Model
2.1 Known Properties of Cournot Markets
3 Markets with Concave Demand
4 Markets with Affine Demand
4.1 Warm Up
Affine Demand, Linear Costs
4.2 Main Result
4.3 Arbitrarily High Losses Due to Merging
References
Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences
3.1 Utility Model with Other-Regarding Preferences
3.2 Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms
3.3 Design Template
4 Minimizing Payments
5 A Case Study: Altruism
5.1 Two Altruism Models and Design Objectives
5.2 Mechanisms for Altruistic Players
5.3 Discussion
6 Impact of Altruism
6.1 Bilateral Trade
6.2 Funding a Public Project
6.3 Minimizing Payments
7 Conclusion
References
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Results
1.2 Related Work
2 Preliminaries
3 LAP for Independent Valuations
3.1 Extension to Irregular Distributions
4 LAP for Correlated Values
A Truthfulness of LAP
References
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Linear Valuation Functions
4 Competitive Markets
5 Agent Types with Capped Linear Valuation Functions
6 Conclusion and Future Work
References
On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 An Improved Truthful Approximation Mechanism
4 A Truthful FPTAS for a Small Number of Tasks
4.1 A Pseudopolynomial Dynamic Programming Algorithm
4.2 The FPTAS
5 Further Implications and Extensions
5.1 Relation to Unsplittable Flow Problems and (In)approximability
5.2 Generalization to Non-interval Structures
6 Discussion and Open Problems
References
Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions
1 Introduction
1.1 Contribution
1.2 Related Literature
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Myerson Lemma
2.2 Explicit Representation
3 Complexity of the Myerson Payment Rule
3.1 Two Agents
3.2 Beyond Two Agents
4 Explicitly Simple Auctions
4.1 Conditions for Strategyproofness
5 Two-State PSAs and Near-Ties
Preface
Organization
Abstracts of Invited Talks
New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items
Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems
Algorithmic Game Theory Meets Behavioral Economics
Contents
Invited Talk
Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems
1 Introduction
2 Fundamental Characteristics of Resource Based Systems
3 Resource-Based Participation
4 Tokenomics
5 Decentralized Service Provision
6 Rewards Sharing
7 A High-Level Blueprint for a Stake-Based System
8 Concluding Remarks
References
Auctions, Markets and Mechanism Design
How Bad is the Merger Paradox?
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Results
1.2 Related Work
2 Model
2.1 Known Properties of Cournot Markets
3 Markets with Concave Demand
4 Markets with Affine Demand
4.1 Warm Up
Affine Demand, Linear Costs
4.2 Main Result
4.3 Arbitrarily High Losses Due to Merging
References
Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences
3.1 Utility Model with Other-Regarding Preferences
3.2 Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms
3.3 Design Template
4 Minimizing Payments
5 A Case Study: Altruism
5.1 Two Altruism Models and Design Objectives
5.2 Mechanisms for Altruistic Players
5.3 Discussion
6 Impact of Altruism
6.1 Bilateral Trade
6.2 Funding a Public Project
6.3 Minimizing Payments
7 Conclusion
References
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Results
1.2 Related Work
2 Preliminaries
3 LAP for Independent Valuations
3.1 Extension to Irregular Distributions
4 LAP for Correlated Values
A Truthfulness of LAP
References
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Linear Valuation Functions
4 Competitive Markets
5 Agent Types with Capped Linear Valuation Functions
6 Conclusion and Future Work
References
On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 An Improved Truthful Approximation Mechanism
4 A Truthful FPTAS for a Small Number of Tasks
4.1 A Pseudopolynomial Dynamic Programming Algorithm
4.2 The FPTAS
5 Further Implications and Extensions
5.1 Relation to Unsplittable Flow Problems and (In)approximability
5.2 Generalization to Non-interval Structures
6 Discussion and Open Problems
References
Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions
1 Introduction
1.1 Contribution
1.2 Related Literature
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Myerson Lemma
2.2 Explicit Representation
3 Complexity of the Myerson Payment Rule
3.1 Two Agents
3.2 Beyond Two Agents
4 Explicitly Simple Auctions
4.1 Conditions for Strategyproofness
5 Two-State PSAs and Near-Ties