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001451066 001__ 1451066
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001451066 019__ $$a1350686977
001451066 020__ $$a9783030964825$$q(electronic bk.)
001451066 020__ $$a3030964825$$q(electronic bk.)
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001451066 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-030-96482-5$$2doi
001451066 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1350552942
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001451066 050_4 $$aK3850
001451066 08204 $$a343.07/21$$223/eng/20221201
001451066 1001_ $$aMarkovits, Richard S.,$$eauthor.
001451066 24510 $$aWelfare economics and antitrust policy.$$nVol. II,$$pMergers, vertical practices, joint ventures, internal growth, and U.S. and E.U. law /$$cRichard S. Markovits.
001451066 24630 $$aMergers, vertical practices, joint ventures, internal growth, and U.S. and E.U. law
001451066 264_1 $$aCham :$$bSpringer,$$c[2022]
001451066 264_4 $$c©2022
001451066 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxi, 394 pages) :$$billustrations
001451066 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001451066 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001451066 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001451066 5050_ $$aIntro -- Preface -- Contents -- Part IIThe Morally-Relevant Effects of Specific Categories of Antitrust-Policy-Coverable Conduct and the Ability of Government to Secure Better Outcomes (Continued) -- 11 Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions -- 11.1 The 16 Ways in Which Horizontal (M&A)s Can Increase Their Participants' Profits
001451066 5058_ $$a11.1.1 The 8 "Sherman-Act-Licit" Ways in Which Horizontal (M&A)s Can Increase Their Participants' Profits-That Is, Can Do So Without Increasing Those Profits by Reducing the Absolute Attractiveness of the Most-Attractive Offers Against Which They Will Have to Compete in a Way That Would Render the (M or A) Profitable Even If It Would Have Been Economically Inefficient in an oPp Economy -- 11.1.2 The 8 Sherman-Act-Illicit Ways in Which a Horizontal (M or A) Can Increase Its Participants' Profits
001451066 5058_ $$a11.2.1 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Marginal-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates -- 11.2.2 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Fixed-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates -- 11.2.3 Analyses That Relate to Any Dynamic Efficiencies That a Horizontal (M or A) Generates
001451066 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001451066 520__ $$aThis book is Volume II of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various kinds of antitrust-policy-coverable conduct and various possible government responses to such conduct, including US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of their economic efficiency, their impact on liberal moral rights, and their instantiation of various utilitarian and other egalitarian conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law and compares the extent to whichwhen correctly interpreted and appliedthese two bodies of law could increase economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This second volume contains the last 6 chapters of Part II, which focus respectively on horizontal (M&A)s, conglomerate (M&A)s, surrogates for vertical integration, vertical (M&A)s, joint ventures, and internal growth and Part III, which focuses on US antitrust law and EU competition law. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust policy, and The General Theory of Second Best.
001451066 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed December 1, 2022).
001451066 650_0 $$aAntitrust law.
001451066 650_0 $$aWelfare economics.
001451066 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001451066 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z3030964817$$z9783030964818$$w(OCoLC)1292591528
001451066 852__ $$bebk
001451066 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-96482-5$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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001451066 980__ $$aEBOOK
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001451066 983__ $$aOnline
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