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Table of Contents
Intro
Much Ado About Something
Something and Material Ontology
Inclusion/Exclusion
Something as an ``A Priori ́́Mental Object
Back to the Stoic
Something and Formal Ontology
Something-as-Something
Something, Being, One
The Chapters of This Book: Some Introductory Remarks
Bibliography
Contents
Contributors
Chapter 1: Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object
1.1 Brentano on Physical Phenomena
1.2 The Identity Thesis and Mental Monism
1.3 The Identity Thesis and Metaphysical Phenomenalism
1.4 Conceptual Dependence of Mental States ́Intentional Objects
1.5 The Theory of Primary and Secondary Objects and the Relationship Between Intentional Object and Presentation
1.6 Objections Against the Idea of Mediating Content
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Husserlś Transcendentals? On Object, Essence, Thing, Being and Substance
2.1 The Starting Point: The Objet/Something or Gegenstand Überhaupt
2.2 Essence
2.3 Formal Essence
2.4 Region
2.5 The Thing or Ding as the Individuum of the Region ``Physical Nature ́́
2.6 The Thing and the Phantom
2.7 Material Thing and Physicalistic Thing
2.8 The Material Thing as the Individuum of the Region ``Nature ́́
2.9 Substance and Being
2.10 Concluding Remarks
Bibliography
Chapter 3: Something But Not Too Much: Ontological Considerations in Intuitionistic Mathematics
3.1 Brouwer
3.2 Arend Heyting
3.3 A Final Comparison
Bibliography
Chapter 4: Russell on the Widest Words in the Philosophical Vocabulary: A Platonic Path Through Terms, Units and Entities
4.1 The Widest Word and Then Some
4.2 A Path Through the Properties of Terms
5.1.1 Existential Autonomous and Existential Heteronomous
5.1.2 Existential Originality and Existential Derivativeness
5.1.3 Existential Self-Sufficiency and Existential Non-Self-Sufficiency
5.1.4 Existential Dependence and Existential Independence
5.2 Ingardenś Theory of Cultural Objects
5.2.1 Distinction Between Cultural Objects and Physical Objects on which they Depend
5.2.2 The Existence and Persistence of Cultural Objects Are Intentional
5.2.3 The Double Dependence of Cultural Objects
5.3 The Extension of the Domain of Intentionality
Much Ado About Something
Something and Material Ontology
Inclusion/Exclusion
Something as an ``A Priori ́́Mental Object
Back to the Stoic
Something and Formal Ontology
Something-as-Something
Something, Being, One
The Chapters of This Book: Some Introductory Remarks
Bibliography
Contents
Contributors
Chapter 1: Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object
1.1 Brentano on Physical Phenomena
1.2 The Identity Thesis and Mental Monism
1.3 The Identity Thesis and Metaphysical Phenomenalism
1.4 Conceptual Dependence of Mental States ́Intentional Objects
1.5 The Theory of Primary and Secondary Objects and the Relationship Between Intentional Object and Presentation
1.6 Objections Against the Idea of Mediating Content
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Husserlś Transcendentals? On Object, Essence, Thing, Being and Substance
2.1 The Starting Point: The Objet/Something or Gegenstand Überhaupt
2.2 Essence
2.3 Formal Essence
2.4 Region
2.5 The Thing or Ding as the Individuum of the Region ``Physical Nature ́́
2.6 The Thing and the Phantom
2.7 Material Thing and Physicalistic Thing
2.8 The Material Thing as the Individuum of the Region ``Nature ́́
2.9 Substance and Being
2.10 Concluding Remarks
Bibliography
Chapter 3: Something But Not Too Much: Ontological Considerations in Intuitionistic Mathematics
3.1 Brouwer
3.2 Arend Heyting
3.3 A Final Comparison
Bibliography
Chapter 4: Russell on the Widest Words in the Philosophical Vocabulary: A Platonic Path Through Terms, Units and Entities
4.1 The Widest Word and Then Some
4.2 A Path Through the Properties of Terms
5.1.1 Existential Autonomous and Existential Heteronomous
5.1.2 Existential Originality and Existential Derivativeness
5.1.3 Existential Self-Sufficiency and Existential Non-Self-Sufficiency
5.1.4 Existential Dependence and Existential Independence
5.2 Ingardenś Theory of Cultural Objects
5.2.1 Distinction Between Cultural Objects and Physical Objects on which they Depend
5.2.2 The Existence and Persistence of Cultural Objects Are Intentional
5.2.3 The Double Dependence of Cultural Objects
5.3 The Extension of the Domain of Intentionality