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001451448 001__ 1451448
001451448 003__ OCoLC
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001451448 019__ $$a1351749884
001451448 020__ $$a9783031101649$$q(electronic bk.)
001451448 020__ $$a3031101642$$q(electronic bk.)
001451448 020__ $$z9783031101632
001451448 020__ $$z3031101634
001451448 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-031-10164-9$$2doi
001451448 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1351657768
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001451448 049__ $$aISEA
001451448 050_4 $$aJZ5865.B56
001451448 08204 $$a327.1/745$$223/eng/20221216
001451448 1001_ $$aCrowley, Michael,$$d1966-$$eauthor.
001451448 24510 $$aToxin and bioregulator weapons :$$bpreventing the misuse of the chemical and life sciences /$$cMichael Crowley, Malcolm R. Dando.
001451448 264_1 $$aCham :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c[2022]
001451448 264_4 $$c©2022
001451448 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxi, 315 pages) :$$billustrations.
001451448 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001451448 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001451448 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001451448 4901_ $$aGlobal issues
001451448 500__ $$aIncludes index.
001451448 5050_ $$aIntro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Praise for Toxin and Bioregulator Weapons -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Purpose and Structure of the Book -- 1.2 Scope of Agents and Activities Covered -- 1.2.1 Toxins -- 1.2.2 Bioregulators -- 1.2.3 Other Chemicals of Biological Origin -- 1.3 Coverage of Toxins and Bioregulators Under International Arms Control and Disarmament Instruments -- 1.4 Dual-Use Research and the Difficulties with Establishing Intent -- 1.5 Methodology
001451448 5058_ $$aChapter 2: Dual-Use Chemical and Life Science Research of Potential Concern -- 2.1 What Is Happening in the Life Sciences? -- 2.2 A Game Changer for Toxin Weapons Development? -- 2.3 Toxicology as Part of the Biotechnology Revolution -- 2.4 Example 1: Botulinum Toxins -- 2.5 Example 2: Staphylococcal Enterotoxins -- 2.6 Example 3: Bioregulators -- 2.7 Advances in Neuroimmunology -- 2.8 The Impact of Long COVID -- 2.9 Conclusions -- Chapter 3: The China Case Study -- 3.1 Historical Toxin Weapon Development -- 3.2 Contemporary Dual-Use Toxin Research -- 3.3 China Brain Project
001451448 5058_ $$a3.4 Central Nervous System-Acting Weapons -- 3.5 Research and Development of Riot Control Agent Delivery Mechanisms -- 3.6 CWC Article X Declarations and the BTWC Confidence-Building Measures -- 3.7 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4: The India Case Study -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Research and Development of Riot Control Agent Means of Delivery -- 4.3 Malodorants -- 4.4 Incapacitating Chemical Agents/CNS-Acting Chemical Agents -- 4.5 Contemporary Dual-Use Toxin Research Into "Novel Bio-Threat Agents" -- 4.6 CWC Article X Declarations and the BTWC Confidence-Building Measures
001451448 5058_ $$a4.7 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 5: The Iran Case Study -- 5.1 Changing Perceptions of Alleged Iranian Biological and Toxin Weapon Programmes -- 5.2 Alleged Toxin Weapon Development -- 5.3 Contemporary Dual-Use Toxin Research, Development, and Production -- 5.4 Riot Control Agents and Incapacitating Chemical Agents/CNS-Acting Agents -- 5.5 CWC Article X Declarations and the BTWC Confidence-Building Measures -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6: The Russian Federation Case Study -- 6.1 Overview of the Soviet Biological and Toxin Weapon Programme
001451448 5058_ $$a6.2 Soviet Toxin Weapon Research and Development -- 6.3 Soviet Bioregulator Weapon Research and Development -- 6.4 Termination of Soviet Biological and Chemical Weapons Programmes -- 6.5 Russian Biological and Toxin Research and Development Capabilities -- 6.6 US Sanctions on Research Facilities Allegedly Linked to Russian BW Programmes -- 6.7 Contemporary Dual-Use Toxin Research -- 6.8 Russian Incapacitating Chemical Agent (ICA)/Central Nervous System (CNS)-Acting Weapons -- 6.9 Russian Riot Control Agent Delivery Mechanisms
001451448 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001451448 520__ $$aUnrivalled collection of concrete examples from across the globe of research where potential for weaponisation and opportunities for repression are high, but intent is unclear or could easily be misperceived. A substantial contribution to the current international debate on how we can raise political and legal barriers to prevent States misusing life science advances. Filippa Lentzos, Senior Lecturer in Science and International Security, King's College London, UK Asks the key question of how states and scientists should respond to the current advances in life science research and development to prevent their weaponisation. A must-read for all concerned. Nariyoshi Shinomiya, President National Defense Medical College of Japan Sheds light on the dangerously neglected threats from toxin and bioregulator weapons, and gives stark warning that current failure to regulate rapidly advancing sciences could allow development of new forms of such weapons capable of attacking diverse human life processes. Paul F. Walker, Vice Chair, Arms Control Association, and International Coordinator, CWC Coalition, USA This book explores how revolutionary developments and convergence of the chemical, life and associated sciences are impacting contemporary toxin and bioregulator research, and examines the risks of such research being misused for malign purposes. Investigating illustrative cases of dual use research of potential concern in China, India, Iran, Russia, Syria and the USA, the authors discuss how states can ensure such research and related activities are not utilised in weapons development. Although toxins and bioregulators are, in theory, covered by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention, this apparent overlap in reality masks a dangerous regulatory gap with neither Convention implemented effectively to address threats of weaponisation. This book highlights the potentially damaging consequences for international peace and security, and proposes realistic routes for action by states and the scientific community. Michael Crowley is Honorary Visiting Senior Research Fellow at Bradford University, and Research Associate with the Omega Research Foundation, UK. Malcolm R. Dando FRSB is Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow at Bradford University, UK.
001451448 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed December 16, 2022).
001451448 63000 $$aConvention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction$$d(1972 April 10)
001451448 650_0 $$aBiological arms control.
001451448 650_0 $$aBiological weapons.
001451448 650_0 $$aToxins.
001451448 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001451448 7001_ $$aDando, Malcolm,$$eauthor.
001451448 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z3031101634$$z9783031101632$$w(OCoLC)1322812433
001451448 830_0 $$aGlobal issues series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm))
001451448 852__ $$bebk
001451448 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-10164-9$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001451448 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1451448$$pGLOBAL_SET
001451448 980__ $$aBIB
001451448 980__ $$aEBOOK
001451448 982__ $$aEbook
001451448 983__ $$aOnline
001451448 994__ $$a92$$bISE