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Title
Trust and credit in organizations and institutions : as viewed from the evolution of cooperation / Mayuko Nakamaru.
ISBN
9789811949791 (electronic bk.)
9811949794 (electronic bk.)
9811949786
9789811949784
Published
Singapore : Springer, [2022]
Copyright
©2022
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xxii, 318 pages) : illustrations.
Other Standard Identifiers
10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1 doi
Call Number
HD58.7
Dewey Decimal Classification
302.3/5
Summary
This book shows that evolutionary game theory can unravel how mutual cooperation, trust, and credit in a group emerge in organizations and institutions. Some organizations and institutions, such as insurance unions, credit unions, and banks, originated from very simple mutual-aid groups. Members in these early-stage mutual-aid groups help each other, making rules to promote cooperation, and suppressing free riders. Then, they come to "trust" not only each other but also the group they belong to, itself. The division of labor occurs when the society comes to have diversity and complexity in a larger group, and the division of labor also requires mutual cooperation and trust among different social roles. In a larger group, people cannot directly interact with each other, and the reputation of unknown people helps other decide who is a trustworthy person. However, if gossip spreads untruths about a reputation, trust and cooperation are destroyed. Therefore, how to suppress untrue gossip is also important for trust and cooperation in a larger group. If trustworthiness and credibility can be established, these groups are successfully sustainable. Some develop and evolve and then mature into larger organizations and institutions. Finally, these organizations and institutions become what they are now. Therefore, not only cooperation but also trust and credit are keys to understanding these organizations and institutions. The evolution of cooperation, a topic of research in evolutionary ecology and evolutionary game theory, can be applied to understanding how to make institutions and organizations sustainable, trustworthy, and credible. It provides us with the idea that evolutionary game theory is a good mathematical tool to analyze trust and credit. This kind of research can be applied to current hot topics such as microfinance and the sustainable use of ecosystems.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
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Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Description based on print version record.
Series
Theoretical biology (Singapore)
What is "the evolution of cooperation"?
The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population under two different updating rules
The effect of peer punishment on the evolution of cooperation
Rotation savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) as an early-stage credit system
Tanomoshi-ko field study and subjective experiment
Who does a group admit into membership or which group does a player want to join?
The mutual-aid game as an early-stage insurance system
Cooperation and punishment in the linear division of labor
Can cooperation evolve when false gossip spreads?
Field abandonment problem in rice paddy fields
Ecological features benefiting sustainable harvesters in socio-ecological systems: A case study of swiftlets in Malaysia.
