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001452151 001__ 1452151
001452151 003__ OCoLC
001452151 005__ 20230310003343.0
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001452151 007__ cr\cn\nnnunnun
001452151 008__ 230111s2022\\\\si\a\\\\ob\\\\000\0\eng\d
001452151 019__ $$a1357536824
001452151 020__ $$a9789811949791$$q(electronic bk.)
001452151 020__ $$a9811949794$$q(electronic bk.)
001452151 020__ $$z9811949786
001452151 020__ $$z9789811949784
001452151 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1$$2doi
001452151 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1357551451
001452151 040__ $$aGW5XE$$beng$$erda$$epn$$cGW5XE$$dYDX$$dUKAHL
001452151 049__ $$aISEA
001452151 050_4 $$aHD58.7
001452151 08204 $$a302.3/5$$223/eng/20230111
001452151 1001_ $$aNakamaru, Mayuko,$$eauthor.
001452151 24510 $$aTrust and credit in organizations and institutions :$$bas viewed from the evolution of cooperation /$$cMayuko Nakamaru.
001452151 264_1 $$aSingapore :$$bSpringer,$$c[2022]
001452151 264_4 $$c©2022
001452151 300__ $$a1 online resource (xxii, 318 pages) :$$billustrations.
001452151 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001452151 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001452151 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001452151 4901_ $$aTheoretical biology
001452151 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
001452151 5050_ $$aWhat is "the evolution of cooperation"? -- The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population under two different updating rules -- The effect of peer punishment on the evolution of cooperation -- Rotation savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) as an early-stage credit system -- Tanomoshi-ko field study and subjective experiment -- Who does a group admit into membership or which group does a player want to join? -- The mutual-aid game as an early-stage insurance system -- Cooperation and punishment in the linear division of labor -- Can cooperation evolve when false gossip spreads? -- Field abandonment problem in rice paddy fields -- Ecological features benefiting sustainable harvesters in socio-ecological systems: A case study of swiftlets in Malaysia.
001452151 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001452151 520__ $$aThis book shows that evolutionary game theory can unravel how mutual cooperation, trust, and credit in a group emerge in organizations and institutions. Some organizations and institutions, such as insurance unions, credit unions, and banks, originated from very simple mutual-aid groups. Members in these early-stage mutual-aid groups help each other, making rules to promote cooperation, and suppressing free riders. Then, they come to "trust" not only each other but also the group they belong to, itself. The division of labor occurs when the society comes to have diversity and complexity in a larger group, and the division of labor also requires mutual cooperation and trust among different social roles. In a larger group, people cannot directly interact with each other, and the reputation of unknown people helps other decide who is a trustworthy person. However, if gossip spreads untruths about a reputation, trust and cooperation are destroyed. Therefore, how to suppress untrue gossip is also important for trust and cooperation in a larger group. If trustworthiness and credibility can be established, these groups are successfully sustainable. Some develop and evolve and then mature into larger organizations and institutions. Finally, these organizations and institutions become what they are now. Therefore, not only cooperation but also trust and credit are keys to understanding these organizations and institutions. The evolution of cooperation, a topic of research in evolutionary ecology and evolutionary game theory, can be applied to understanding how to make institutions and organizations sustainable, trustworthy, and credible. It provides us with the idea that evolutionary game theory is a good mathematical tool to analyze trust and credit. This kind of research can be applied to current hot topics such as microfinance and the sustainable use of ecosystems.
001452151 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
001452151 650_0 $$aOrganizational behavior.
001452151 650_0 $$aReliability.
001452151 650_0 $$aTrust.
001452151 650_0 $$aGame theory.
001452151 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001452151 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aNAKAMARU, MAYUKO.$$tTRUST AND CREDIT IN ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS.$$d[Place of publication not identified] : SPRINGER VERLAG, SINGAPOR, 2022$$z9811949786$$w(OCoLC)1331704207
001452151 830_0 $$aTheoretical biology (Singapore)
001452151 852__ $$bebk
001452151 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001452151 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1452151$$pGLOBAL_SET
001452151 980__ $$aBIB
001452151 980__ $$aEBOOK
001452151 982__ $$aEbook
001452151 983__ $$aOnline
001452151 994__ $$a92$$bISE