001455046 000__ 03185nam\a2200481\i\4500
001455046 001__ 1455046
001455046 003__ OCoLC
001455046 005__ 20230314003240.0
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001455046 007__ cr\cn\nnnunnun
001455046 008__ 230302s2023\\\\sz\a\\\\o\\\\\001\0\eng\d
001455046 020__ $$a9783031191084$$q(electronic bk.)
001455046 020__ $$a3031191080$$q(electronic bk.)
001455046 020__ $$z3031191072
001455046 020__ $$z9783031191077
001455046 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-031-19108-4$$2doi
001455046 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1371520954
001455046 040__ $$aGW5XE$$beng$$erda$$epn$$cGW5XE
001455046 049__ $$aISEA
001455046 050_4 $$aJZ5865.B56
001455046 08204 $$a327.1/745$$223/eng/20230302
001455046 1001_ $$aDando, Malcolm,$$eauthor.
001455046 24514 $$aThe chemical and biological nonproliferation regime after the Covid-19 pandemic :$$bdealing with the scientific revolution in the life science /$$cMalcolm Dando.
001455046 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c2023.
001455046 300__ $$a1 online resource (1 volume) :$$billustrations (black and white).
001455046 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001455046 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001455046 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001455046 500__ $$aIncludes index.
001455046 5050_ $$aChapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Novel Neuroweapons -- Chapter 3: Neuroscience Developments of Concern -- Chapter 4: The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Chapter 5: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention -- Chapter 6: Conclusion.
001455046 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001455046 520__ $$aThis book offers an analysis of how the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) regime has responded in the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus has highlighted the need to better protect modern societies from natural, accidental and deliberate disease affecting humans, animals and plants. Within that context preventing the deliberate hostile use of biological and chemical agents will be of increasing importance. Dando asks to what extent there has been a significant strengthening to the CBW non-proliferation regime in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic using an analysis focused on two proposals to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which aim to constrain advances in science and technology developments that could be misused. On this basis he concludes that it would be hard to argue that to date there has been a significant strengthening of the CBW regime. Malcolm Dando is Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow, Division of Peace Studies and International Development, School of Social Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
001455046 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
001455046 650_0 $$aBiological arms control.
001455046 650_0 $$aChemical arms control.
001455046 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001455046 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aDANDO, MALCOLM.$$tCHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AFTER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.$$d[Place of publication not identified] : PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2023$$z3031191072$$w(OCoLC)1345510667
001455046 852__ $$bebk
001455046 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-19108-4$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001455046 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1455046$$pGLOBAL_SET
001455046 980__ $$aBIB
001455046 980__ $$aEBOOK
001455046 982__ $$aEbook
001455046 983__ $$aOnline
001455046 994__ $$a92$$bISE