Intro
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 The Meaning of ``Chaos'' in Legislative Politics
1.2 Is Legislative Chaos Relevant?
1.3 Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay
1.4 The Conditions for Chaos May Exist Elsewhere if We Dare to Look
1.5 Does Assuming Chaos Destroy Political Science?
1.6 Who This Book Is For
Part I Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay
2 The Potential Causes of Legislative Stability
2.1 Sacrifices are Necessary to Solve Chaos
2.2 Solving Chaos I: Preference-Induced Equilibriums

2.3 Solving Chaos II: Structure-Induced Equilibriums
2.4 Solving Chaos III: Dictatorship
2.5 The Alternative to Solving Chaos: Describing Chaos
3 Preference-Induced Equilibriums I: Weak Ideologies Promote Chaos
3.1 Conceptualizing Preferences
3.2 Measuring Preferences
3.3 Hypotheses: Preference Structures and Legislative Stability
3.4 Analysis of True, Ideological Preferences in Paraguay
3.4.1 Unidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences
3.4.2 Discussion of Unidimensional Analysis
3.4.3 Multidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences

3.4.4 Discussion About True Ideological Preferences
3.4.5 Conclusions About True Preferences
3.5 Analysis of Expressed Preferences
3.5.1 Results of Analysis of Expressed Preferences
3.5.2 Discussion of Structure of Expressed Preferences
3.5.3 Qualitative Analysis of Estimated Ideal Points
3.6 Correspondence Between True and Expressed Preferences
3.7 Discussion
3.8 Conclusions and Implications
4 Preference-Induced Equilibriums II: Electoral Incentives Promote Chaos
4.1 Replacement: Realignment Through Static Preferences

4.2 Modification: Realignment Through Preference Change
4.3 Institutional Expectations for Preference Change in Paraguay
4.4 Baseline of Static Preferences
4.5 Comparison Group of Time-Modeling Procedures
4.6 Comparison Groups of Independent Estimates
4.7 Comparing Five-Year, Local First Dimensions to the Global First Dimension
4.8 Comparing Yearly, Local First Dimensions to the Global First Dimension
4.9 Comparing the Yearly, Local First Dimensions to the Global First and Second Dimensions

4.10 Comparing Yearly, Local Second Dimensions to the Global First and Second Dimensions
4.11 Inspecting Temporal Salience of Each Dimension Using Cutline Angles
4.12 The Cartes Presidency (2013-2018): A Case Study of Preference Change Due to Intra-party Electoral Competition
4.13 Conclusions
5 Structure-Induced Equilibriums: Weak Agenda-Setting Powers Promote Chaos
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Weak Agenda-Setting Powers in Paraguay
5.2.1 Constitutional Limitations to Agenda-Setting Powers
5.2.2 Chamber Rules: Limits of Agenda-Setting in Both Chambers
5.2.2.1 Legislative Actors