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001467737 019__ $$a1378391984
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001467737 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-031-27777-1$$2doi
001467737 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1378290887
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001467737 050_4 $$aB808.5$$b.R46 2023
001467737 08204 $$a146.4$$223/eng/20230516
001467737 1001_ $$aRhode, Conny.
001467737 24514 $$aThe burden of proof upon metaphysical methods /$$cConny Rhode.
001467737 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c2023.
001467737 300__ $$a1 online resource
001467737 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001467737 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001467737 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001467737 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
001467737 5050_ $$aIntro -- The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Tables -- 1: Dialogue and Persuasion -- 1.1 The Problem of Methodological Conservatism -- 1.2 Commitments in Attitude and Dialogue -- 1.3 An Analysis of Philosophical Dialogues -- Types of Dialogue -- Philosophers' Self-Conceptions -- Methodology -- Example Analysis: Willoughby (2012) -- Results -- Attitudinal Goals -- 1.4 Looking Ahead -- References -- 2: The Burden of Proof -- 2.1 Egalitarianism versus Foundationalism -- 2.2 Allocating the Burden of Proof
001467737 5058_ $$a2.3 The Prudence of Dialogical Egalitarianism in Philosophy -- References -- 3: Evidence, Inference, and Empiricism -- 3.1 Meeting the Burden of Proof -- 3.2 Evidence -- 3.3 Implication Barriers -- 3.4 Addressing Counter-Examples -- 3.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Barriers -- 3.6 Empiricism -- References -- 4: Philosophical Methods between Content and the World -- 4.1 Consequences of Dialogical Empiricism -- 4.2 The Content/World Separation -- 4.3 Hypotheses in Philosophy -- Psycho-Linguistic and Non-Psycho-Linguistic Subject Matter -- Concepts -- Cognition -- Necessary Truth
001467737 5058_ $$a4.4 Evidence in Philosophy -- Intuitions -- Common Sense -- Ordinary Language Usage -- Theoretical Virtues -- Method of Cases -- Reflective Equilibrium -- Conceptual Analysis and the Canberra Plan -- Experimental Philosophy -- 4.5 Against the Content/World Separation -- The Easy Approach -- Content Externalism -- Agential Realism -- Calibration -- Mentalism -- References -- 5: Metaphysical Hypotheses -- 5.1 Substantive Consequences -- 5.2 Normativity -- 5.3 Necessity -- 5.4 Epistemology -- 5.5 Ontology -- 5.6 Quietism -- References -- 6: Escaping Dialogical Empiricism
001467737 5058_ $$a6.1 Looking Behind -- 6.2 A Way Around? -- 6.3 A Way Out? -- References -- Appendix A Reputational Journal Ranking -- Appendix B Population Size -- Appendix C Example Analyses -- Appendix D Analysis Results -- Index
001467737 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001467737 520__ $$aWho carries the burden of proof in analytic philosophical debates, and how can this burden be satisfied? As it turns out, the answer to this joint question yields a fundamental challenge to the very conduct of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. Empirical research presented in this book indicates that the vastly predominant goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues lies not in discovering truths or generating knowledge, but merely in prevailing over ones opponents. Given this goal, the book examines how most effectively to allocate and discharge the burden of proof. It focuses on premises that must prudently be avoided because a burden of proof on them could never be satisfied, and in particular discusses unsupportable bridge premises across inference barriers, like Humes barrier between is and ought, or the barrier between the content of our talk or thought, and the world beyond such content. Employing this content/world barrier for a critical assessment of mainstream analytic philosophical methods, this book argues that we must prudently avoid invoking intuitions or other content of thought or talk in support of claims about the world beyond content, that is, metaphysically significant claims. Yet as content-located evidence is practically indispensable to metaphysical debates throughout analytic philosophy, from ethics to the philosophy of mathematics, this book reaches the startling conclusion that all such metaphysical debates must, prudently, be terminated. Conny Rhodes research at the University of York focused on philosophical methodology and argumentation theory, beside forays into the philosophy of science, post-Kantian philosophy, and political and moral philosophy, often employing a feminist perspective. In light of the conclusion derived in this book, Rhode has left academic philosophy and now insists on appropriate evidence in accountancy instead.
001467737 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
001467737 650_0 $$aAnalysis (Philosophy)
001467737 650_0 $$aMetaphysics$$xMethodology.
001467737 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001467737 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z3031277767$$z9783031277764$$w(OCoLC)1369519608
001467737 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aRHODE, CONNY.$$tBURDEN OF PROOF UPON METAPHYSICAL METHODS.$$d[S.l.] : PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2023$$z3031277767$$w(OCoLC)1369519608
001467737 852__ $$bebk
001467737 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-27777-1$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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001467737 980__ $$aBIB
001467737 980__ $$aEBOOK
001467737 982__ $$aEbook
001467737 983__ $$aOnline
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