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Table of Contents
Intro
Preface
Contents
Contributors
Life and Mind: An Introduction
1 Life and Mind: An introduction
2 Introduction to Part I: Embodiment, Perception and Cognition
3 Introduction to Part II: Evolution, Language and Culture
4 Introduction to Part III: Gene and Genotype Metaphysics
5 Introduction to Part IV: Teleology in Biology and Cognitive Sciences
6 Conclusion
References
Part I: Embodiment, Perception and Cognition
Animal Understanding and Animal Self-Awareness
1 Introduction
2 Understanding and Animal Understanding
3 Understanding and Self-Understanding
4 Self-Understanding and Agency
5 Social Self-Understanding, Social Agency and Social Self-Awareness
6 Awareness and Understanding
7 Conclusion
References
A Methodological Response to the Motley Crew Argument: Explaining Cognitive Phenomena Through Enactivism and Ethology
1 Introduction
2 Enactivismś Methodological Challenges and First Steps to a Full Response
2.1 Enactivism: Basic Ideas and Concepts
2.2 The Ethological Approach to Behavior
2.3 Conceptual Common Ground: The Notion of Action-Readiness
3 Ethologyś Options to Render ``Motley Crews ́́Scientifically Accessible
3.1 A Case Study of Risk Evaluation in Gregarious Birds
3.2 Further Ethological Support: A Distributed Network of Constituents for Flight Initiation
4 Conclusion
References
Causal Closure, Synaptic Transmission and Emergent Mental Properties
1 The Causal Argument for Physicalism
2 Two Models of Mental Causation
3 The Causal Closure Principle
4 The Argument from Physiology
4.1 The First Component
4.2 The Second Component
5 Synaptic Transmission, Causal Closure and Emergence
References
Color and Competence: A New View of Color Perception
1 Introduction: Why Non-Ideal Cases Matter from the Start
2 Three Desiderata for Philosophical Accounts of Color Perception
2.1 A View Should Not Attribute Widespread Failure to (Normally Functioning) Color Visual Systems
2.2 A View Should Allow for Instances of Color Visual System Failure
2.3 A View Should Allow us to Evaluate and Explain Specific Color Experiences
3 The Competence-Embeddedness of Color Vision
3.1 Competences and Capacities
3.2 Relevant Competences
3.3 Case Study: The Color Visual System and Figure-Ground Segregation
3.4 Why Color Perception Is Not a Competence
4 ``Textbook Color Illusions ́́as Test Cases
4.1 Clashing Competences
4.2 Color Assimilation: Watercolor Effect
4.3 Simultaneous Color Contrast: Pink/Grey Petals
5 Objections, Replies, and Further Developments
5.1 Intuitions and Common Sense
5.2 The Second Desideratum and Normal Illusion Talk
5.3 When the Chromatic Experiences of Normal Perceivers Dramatically Diverge: ``The Dress, ́́Etc
6 Conclusion: The Three Desiderata Revisited
References
Preface
Contents
Contributors
Life and Mind: An Introduction
1 Life and Mind: An introduction
2 Introduction to Part I: Embodiment, Perception and Cognition
3 Introduction to Part II: Evolution, Language and Culture
4 Introduction to Part III: Gene and Genotype Metaphysics
5 Introduction to Part IV: Teleology in Biology and Cognitive Sciences
6 Conclusion
References
Part I: Embodiment, Perception and Cognition
Animal Understanding and Animal Self-Awareness
1 Introduction
2 Understanding and Animal Understanding
3 Understanding and Self-Understanding
4 Self-Understanding and Agency
5 Social Self-Understanding, Social Agency and Social Self-Awareness
6 Awareness and Understanding
7 Conclusion
References
A Methodological Response to the Motley Crew Argument: Explaining Cognitive Phenomena Through Enactivism and Ethology
1 Introduction
2 Enactivismś Methodological Challenges and First Steps to a Full Response
2.1 Enactivism: Basic Ideas and Concepts
2.2 The Ethological Approach to Behavior
2.3 Conceptual Common Ground: The Notion of Action-Readiness
3 Ethologyś Options to Render ``Motley Crews ́́Scientifically Accessible
3.1 A Case Study of Risk Evaluation in Gregarious Birds
3.2 Further Ethological Support: A Distributed Network of Constituents for Flight Initiation
4 Conclusion
References
Causal Closure, Synaptic Transmission and Emergent Mental Properties
1 The Causal Argument for Physicalism
2 Two Models of Mental Causation
3 The Causal Closure Principle
4 The Argument from Physiology
4.1 The First Component
4.2 The Second Component
5 Synaptic Transmission, Causal Closure and Emergence
References
Color and Competence: A New View of Color Perception
1 Introduction: Why Non-Ideal Cases Matter from the Start
2 Three Desiderata for Philosophical Accounts of Color Perception
2.1 A View Should Not Attribute Widespread Failure to (Normally Functioning) Color Visual Systems
2.2 A View Should Allow for Instances of Color Visual System Failure
2.3 A View Should Allow us to Evaluate and Explain Specific Color Experiences
3 The Competence-Embeddedness of Color Vision
3.1 Competences and Capacities
3.2 Relevant Competences
3.3 Case Study: The Color Visual System and Figure-Ground Segregation
3.4 Why Color Perception Is Not a Competence
4 ``Textbook Color Illusions ́́as Test Cases
4.1 Clashing Competences
4.2 Color Assimilation: Watercolor Effect
4.3 Simultaneous Color Contrast: Pink/Grey Petals
5 Objections, Replies, and Further Developments
5.1 Intuitions and Common Sense
5.2 The Second Desideratum and Normal Illusion Talk
5.3 When the Chromatic Experiences of Normal Perceivers Dramatically Diverge: ``The Dress, ́́Etc
6 Conclusion: The Three Desiderata Revisited
References