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Table of Contents
Intro
The Institutional Structure of Macroprudential Policy in the UK: Accountability Between Brexit and Economic Connection with the Internal Market
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background of the Book
1.2 Research Inquiry
1.3 Book Outline
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Financial Crisis: The Impact on the UK Economy
1.3.2 Chapter 3: The Macroprudential Shift: A Policy Pillar in the Making
1.3.3 Chapter 4: The Political Economy of MPP: Delegation and Accountability
1.3.4 Chapter 5: FPC: The Institutional Framework
1.3.5 Chapter 6: Transparency Requirements of the FPC: The Accountability-Efficiency Trade-off
1.3.6 Chapter 7: The NEDs of the Court of the Bank of England: Non-executive Directors as Guardians of the Public Interest
1.3.7 Chapter 8: The Role of the Treasury Select Committee
1.3.8 Chapter 9: The Limits of Judicial Review
1.3.9 Chapter 10: International Bodies as an Extra-Legal Accountability Mechanism
1.3.10 Epilogue
References
Chapter 2: The Crisis Impact on the UK Economy
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The UK Financial Services Debate
2.3 Trajectory of the 2007-2009 Crisis
2.4 Assessing the Domestic Consequences of the Crisis
References
Chapter 3: The Macroprudential Shift: A Policy Pillar in the Making
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Limitations of Microprudential Regulation
3.3 Towards an Operational Definition of MPP
3.3.1 Financial Stability
3.3.2 Systemic Risk
3.3.3 Macroprudential Policy
3.4 An Overview of Systemic Risk Metrics and MPP Tools
3.4.1 Systemic Risk Metrics
3.4.2 Overview of MPP Tools
3.5 The Major Analytical Challenges Ahead: Ten Years After the Crisis
References
Chapter 4: The Political Economy of MPP: Delegation and Accountability
4.1 Delegation of MPP as an 'Ulysses Pact'
4.1.1 Exploring the Technical Competences of Central Banks
4.1.2 Monetary Policy: A Prime Example of Time Inconsistent Policy
4.1.3 Time-Inconsistency in MPP as 'Inaction Bias'
4.1.4 The Interests of the Finance Industry
4.2 Public Interest vs. Regulatory Capture in MPP
4.2.1 Defining Public Interest in MPP
4.2.2 Regulatory Capture in MPP
4.3 An Accountability Framework for MPP Authorities
4.3.1 Theoretical Considerations
4.3.2 Accountability in Central Banking
4.3.3 Compounding Challenges Towards an Accountability Framework for MPP
4.3.4 A Complementary Reputational Approach to Institutional Accountability
References
Chapter 5: FPC: The Institutional Framework
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Lack of Institutional Focus Over Financial Stability
5.3 The Financial Services Act 2012
5.3.1 PRA, FCA and Resolution Regime Reforms
5.3.2 The Institutional Framework of FPC
5.3.3 FPC: The First Ten Years, 2011-2020
5.4 FPC: With Great Power Comes Great Accountability
References
The Institutional Structure of Macroprudential Policy in the UK: Accountability Between Brexit and Economic Connection with the Internal Market
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background of the Book
1.2 Research Inquiry
1.3 Book Outline
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Financial Crisis: The Impact on the UK Economy
1.3.2 Chapter 3: The Macroprudential Shift: A Policy Pillar in the Making
1.3.3 Chapter 4: The Political Economy of MPP: Delegation and Accountability
1.3.4 Chapter 5: FPC: The Institutional Framework
1.3.5 Chapter 6: Transparency Requirements of the FPC: The Accountability-Efficiency Trade-off
1.3.6 Chapter 7: The NEDs of the Court of the Bank of England: Non-executive Directors as Guardians of the Public Interest
1.3.7 Chapter 8: The Role of the Treasury Select Committee
1.3.8 Chapter 9: The Limits of Judicial Review
1.3.9 Chapter 10: International Bodies as an Extra-Legal Accountability Mechanism
1.3.10 Epilogue
References
Chapter 2: The Crisis Impact on the UK Economy
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The UK Financial Services Debate
2.3 Trajectory of the 2007-2009 Crisis
2.4 Assessing the Domestic Consequences of the Crisis
References
Chapter 3: The Macroprudential Shift: A Policy Pillar in the Making
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Limitations of Microprudential Regulation
3.3 Towards an Operational Definition of MPP
3.3.1 Financial Stability
3.3.2 Systemic Risk
3.3.3 Macroprudential Policy
3.4 An Overview of Systemic Risk Metrics and MPP Tools
3.4.1 Systemic Risk Metrics
3.4.2 Overview of MPP Tools
3.5 The Major Analytical Challenges Ahead: Ten Years After the Crisis
References
Chapter 4: The Political Economy of MPP: Delegation and Accountability
4.1 Delegation of MPP as an 'Ulysses Pact'
4.1.1 Exploring the Technical Competences of Central Banks
4.1.2 Monetary Policy: A Prime Example of Time Inconsistent Policy
4.1.3 Time-Inconsistency in MPP as 'Inaction Bias'
4.1.4 The Interests of the Finance Industry
4.2 Public Interest vs. Regulatory Capture in MPP
4.2.1 Defining Public Interest in MPP
4.2.2 Regulatory Capture in MPP
4.3 An Accountability Framework for MPP Authorities
4.3.1 Theoretical Considerations
4.3.2 Accountability in Central Banking
4.3.3 Compounding Challenges Towards an Accountability Framework for MPP
4.3.4 A Complementary Reputational Approach to Institutional Accountability
References
Chapter 5: FPC: The Institutional Framework
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Lack of Institutional Focus Over Financial Stability
5.3 The Financial Services Act 2012
5.3.1 PRA, FCA and Resolution Regime Reforms
5.3.2 The Institutional Framework of FPC
5.3.3 FPC: The First Ten Years, 2011-2020
5.4 FPC: With Great Power Comes Great Accountability
References